About elisa freschi

My long-term program is to make "Indian Philosophy" part of "Philosophy". You can follow me also on my personal blog: elisafreschi.com, on Academia, on Amazon, etc.

A basic introduction to Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta_UPDATED

(I have been asked to write a short introduction to Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta and would like to test it on you, dear readers and fellow bloggers. Any comment or criticism would be more than welcome!) In its full-fledged form, the Viśiṣṭādvaita Continue reading

Bhakti in Rāmānuja: Continuities and changes of perspective

(The following is my attempt to make sense of Rāmānuja’s conceptions of bhakti. Comments and criticisms are welcome!) To Rāmānuja (traditional dates 1017–1137) are attributed, with more or less certainty, a series of Vedāntic works, namely the Śrī Bhāṣya (henceforth Continue reading

In search of a Lost Philosophical Dialog in Mithila: An interview with Pundit Kishorenath Jha (A guest post by Debajyoti Gangopadhyay) UPDATED

Pundit Kishorenath Jha is one among the last very few Naiyāyikas of note of Maithil origin (according to traditional sources also Udayana, Vācaspati and Śaṅkara Miśra were born in the same Madhubanī district of North Bihar). After retiring from Ganganath Continue reading

God and realism. Marginal notes on a workshop in Hawai’i, part 2

Can God as the perfect omniscient knower guarantee the possibility of a reality disidentified from all local perspectives and thus independent of them, though remaining inherently intelligible (by God Himself)? It depends on how one understands God. As discussed already Continue reading

Omniscience and realism: Marginal notes about a workshop in Hawai’i

A non-intelligible entity cannot be conceived to exist. But, if the world needs to be known in order to exist, we need to postulate a non-partial perspective out of which it can be known. Since the perspectives of all human Continue reading

The Mīmāṃsā approach to the sentence meaning as something to be done

According to Mīmāṃsā authors, and unlike Nyāya ones, Vedic sentences do not convey the existence of something, but rather that something should be done. This means that the entire Veda is an instrument of knowledge only as regards duties and Continue reading

Buddhism and Phenomenology

Victoria Lysenko has been so nice as to alert me about a recent workshop on Buddhism Phenomenology, to which very interesting authorities on both topics (ranging from Dan Zahavi to “our” Christian Coseru) contributed. They realised an interactive poster through Continue reading