I am reading “Seeing absence” by Anna Farennikova (2013) on the epistemological experience of knowing that something is absent. The article (kindly suggested to me by Jack Beaulieu) deals with exactly the topic dealt with by Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya authors Continue reading “Seeing absence”
The following is a guest post by Krishna Del Toso cogitating on how to interpret a text. You can read more about him on Academia, here. Some time ago a friend of mine was working on his PhD thesis and Continue reading Buffaloes, crocodiles and sacrifices—A guest post by Krishna Del Toso
Maṇḍana reforms Mīmāṃsā philosophy of action and deontic by saying that one undertakes actions only because one believes them to be the means to a desired output. A problem Maṇḍana needs to face is the following: If the performance of Continue reading Fixed duties require less care in their performance than optional ones (Maṇḍana’s view)
We received from Yujin Nagasawa (via Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad): I am starting a new Templeton-funded project called the Global Philosophy of Religion (https://www.global-philosophy.org/). The aim of the project is to promote research involving philosophers of religion from all religious traditions and Continue reading Post-Doc Fellowships in Global Philosophy of Religion
We all know so many clever jokes about how hell should be preferred “because of the good company” and about how boring should heaven be. Let me take the chance to focus on the Śrīvaiṣṇava heaven, i.e., Vaikuṇṭha, and see Continue reading The theology of Vaikuṇṭha: Why should you want to be in heaven?
When philosophers and translators approached Ferdinand de Saussure’s theory of langue vs parole, they initially thought of translating parole with ‘word’ or its various synonyms in many languages. The problem is that parole can mean ‘word’, but that in French Continue reading How to translate śabda?
In the Nyāyasiddhāñjana and the Nyāyapariśuddhi, Veṅkaṭanātha discusses some fundamental ontological topics in order to distinguish his positions from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position. The Nyāyasūtra proposes a fundamental division of realities into dravya ‘substances’, guṇa ‘qualities’, and karman ‘actions’,1 with the Continue reading Inert and alive substances: Alternative classifications in Veṅkaṭanātha
The chapter on epistemology (tarkapāda) is the first chapter in the basic text of Mīmāṃsā, the Mīmāṃsāsūtra, but was presumably the last one added to the Mīmāṃsā hermeneutic enterprise.
Within the Vidhiviveka, a Prābhākara-inclined Mīmāṃsaka debates with a Vedāntin about the meaning of Upaniṣadic sentences on the self. The Prābhākara insists that all sentences should be injunctive in character, and that Upaniṣadic sentences should also be interpreted in this Continue reading Could Upaniṣadic sentences be interpreted as prescriptions? A debate within Maṇḍana’s Vidhiviveka
In his Seśvaramīmāṃsā ad 1.1.12, Veṅkaṭanātha explains that the example of proper names does not prove that language in general depends on convention. He writes that the case of proper names is not a dahanadṛṣṭānta, possibly ‘an example which sets Continue reading The role of convention in signification