Book Review of Engaging Buddhism: Why It Matters to Philosophy by Jay L. Garfield (Reviewed by Mark Siderits)

Jay L. Garfield. Engaging Buddhism: Why It Matters to Philosophy. xxii + 376 pp., index. NY: Oxford University Press, 2015. $29.95 (paperback). My job in reviewing this book is made much easier by something Garfield says early on: ‘Mark Siderits Continue reading

Book Review of Hinduism and Environmental Ethics by Christopher G. Framarin (Reviewed by Stephen Harris)

Christopher G. Framarin. Hinduism and Environmental Ethics: Law, literature, and philosophy. 192 pp. London and New York: Routledge. 2014. 140 USD. This book is a welcome addition to the literature on Indian philosophy and environmental ethics. Framarin’s main thesis is Continue reading

The Matilal Strategy

B. K. Matilal (1935-1991) was undoubtedly one of the most influential scholars of Indian philosophy in the late 20th century. His work has greatly influenced many of us who work on Indian philosophy today, especially if we do so in Continue reading

Book Review of The Śrīvaiṣṇava Theological Dispute by Patricia Y. Mumme (Reviewed by Elisa Freschi)

Patricia Y. Mumme. The Śrīvaiṣṇava Theological Dispute. Maṇavāḷamāmuni and Vedānta Deśika. xviii+320 pp., index. Bangalore: Navbharath Publications, 2000 (1st ed. Madras 1988). 25 USD. The book is a unique contribution to the study of Śrīvaiṣṇavism insofar as it takes into Continue reading

Book Review of The Bhagavad Gita: A Biography, by Richard H. Davis (Reviewed by Matthew R. Dasti)

The Bhagavad Gita: A Biography. By Richard H. Davis. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015. Pp. x + 243. Hardcover $24.95, ISBN 978-0-691-133996-8. Richard H. Davis’s The Bhagavad Gita: A Biography is a recent offering within Princeton University Press’s series “Lives Continue reading

Candrakīrti and Jayarāśi on Dignāga’s Epistemology (Part Two)

In Part One, I explained the critiques of Dignāga’s epistemology offered by Candrakīrti and Jayarāśi. In Part Two, I’ll consider whether these arguments create serious problems for Dignāga’s epistemology. I suspect that the two arguments are different in that Candrakīrti Continue reading

Candrakīrti and Jayarāśi on Dignāga’s Epistemology (Part One)

In his Pramāṇasamuccaya, Dignāga claims that there are two means of knowledge (pramāṇas): perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna). Perception has as its object the particular (svalakṣana); inference has as its object the universal (sāmānyalakṣana). The key distinguishing feature between the two is Continue reading