How do Sanskrit philosophers deal with solipsism? Some Buddhist epistemologists just accepted it, as a necessary consequence of their idealism. The example of Ratnakīrti’s “Rejection of the existence of other continuous sequences [of causes and effects leading to the illusion Continue reading Solipsism in Sanskrit philosophy: Preliminary thoughts
Almost all the chapters I will deal with in this second post (“Part 1” in the book) are about a defence of objects. The next bunch of chapters will be about a defence of subjects and the last one will Continue reading Thoughts on Arindam Chakrabarti’s Realisms Interlinked / Part 2
Author: A philosopher of two worlds, pupil of amazing scholars of Nyāya and of Analytic philosophy, completely accomplished in both worlds in a way which is hard to repeat —Book: It puts together Arindam’s research of 27 years. Thus, it Continue reading Thoughts on Realisms interlinked by Arindam Chakrabarti 1/ [UPDATED]
Hi all, this is Szymon. In previous posts, I presented the Dharmakīrtian approach to the liar paradox and introduced the contemptible consequence problem. Today, I will give five answers to this problem and tell you what I plan to do Continue reading Answering the contemptible consequence problem
Hello again, this is Szymon, a PhD student researching the Dharmakīrtian approach to liar paradox. According to this approach—you can find more about it in my previous post—the liar sentence is ambiguous, unbelievable, and cannot express a warranted belief. There’s Continue reading The contemptible consequence problem
Hello again, this is Szymon, a PhD student working on Buddhist logic. In my last post, I talked about the methodological background of my project. Today, I will tell you what Dharmakīrti says about liar-like sentences and how we can Continue reading Dharmakīrti and liar paradox
Note by EF: This post is part of our series dedicated to younger colleagues presenting themselves and their research, like Manasicha Akepiyapornchai did here and Anusha Rao did here. For more on Szymon, see here. Hello everyone, my name is Continue reading My project on Buddhist epistemology of logic—First guest post by Szymon Bogacz
Śālikanātha discusses the definition of a source of knowledge (pramāṇa) at the beginning of his Pramāṇapārāyaṇa and analyses various criteria. First of all, he discusses the criterion of avisaṃvāditva ‘non deviation’ (used by Dharmakīrti and his school) and shows how Continue reading How to define valid cognition if you are Śālikanātha (analysis of various criteria)?
The beginning of Śālikanātha’s Pramāṇapārāyaṇa is dedicated to a discussion of how to define pramāṇa ‘instrument of valid cognition’. As it was custom since Dignāga’s innovation in the philosophical style, Śālikanātha quotes and refutes several positions. The first ones are Continue reading How to define valid cognition (against Buddhists) if you are Śālikanātha?
The Pacific Meeting of the American Philosophical Association (APA) is taking place this week (April 17-20) in Vancouver, Canada. You can find more information, including the schedule, here. There are two sessions focusing mainly on Indian philosophy. Wed. 9am-12pm APA Continue reading Pacific APA in Vancouver (April 17-20): Indian Philosophy and More