First thoughts on omniscience in Indian thought

“Omniscience” (sārvajñya) assumes many different meanings in the various Indian philosophies. The understanding possibly most common in European and Anglo-American thought, which sees omniscience as including the knowledge of any possible thing in the past, present and future, is neither Continue reading First thoughts on omniscience in Indian thought

The significance of ethics to Candrakīrti’s metaphysics

As I noted last time, I think the disregard of ethics by Indian-philosophy scholars like Dan Arnold is a problem in itself: it’s a misconception of what philosophy is, and one that harmfully shrinks the field of the study of Continue reading The significance of ethics to Candrakīrti’s metaphysics

What Counts as a Tradition in Indian Philosophy?: The Case of Skepticism

Scholars of all types of philosophy are fond of referring to philosophical traditions. But what does this mean? What counts as a tradition? In the Indian context one way to discuss a tradition is with the word darśana, which literally means Continue reading What Counts as a Tradition in Indian Philosophy?: The Case of Skepticism

A basic introduction to Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta_UPDATED

(I have been asked to write a short introduction to Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta and would like to test it on you, dear readers and fellow bloggers. Any comment or criticism would be more than welcome!) In its full-fledged form, the Viśiṣṭādvaita Continue reading A basic introduction to Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta_UPDATED

Omniscience and realism: Marginal notes about a workshop in Hawai’i

A non-intelligible entity cannot be conceived to exist. But, if the world needs to be known in order to exist, we need to postulate a non-partial perspective out of which it can be known. Since the perspectives of all human Continue reading Omniscience and realism: Marginal notes about a workshop in Hawai’i

The Mīmāṃsā approach to the sentence meaning as something to be done

According to Mīmāṃsā authors, and unlike Nyāya ones, Vedic sentences do not convey the existence of something, but rather that something should be done. This means that the entire Veda is an instrument of knowledge only as regards duties and Continue reading The Mīmāṃsā approach to the sentence meaning as something to be done

Interview with Mark Siderits, a guest post by Debajyoti Gangopadhyay* (part 1)

(This dialog is part of the Dialog mission, about which see here and this post) Debajyoti Gangopadhyay: Professor Siderits, you are widely acclaimed for your contribution in Buddhist Philosophy. What precisely motivated you to study Philosophy in Asia? The Question Continue reading Interview with Mark Siderits, a guest post by Debajyoti Gangopadhyay* (part 1)

Book Review of Engaging Buddhism: Why It Matters to Philosophy by Jay L. Garfield (Reviewed by Mark Siderits)

Jay L. Garfield. Engaging Buddhism: Why It Matters to Philosophy. xxii + 376 pp., index. NY: Oxford University Press, 2015. $29.95 (paperback). My job in reviewing this book is made much easier by something Garfield says early on: ‘Mark Siderits Continue reading Book Review of Engaging Buddhism: Why It Matters to Philosophy by Jay L. Garfield (Reviewed by Mark Siderits)