What Counts as a Tradition in Indian Philosophy?: The Case of Skepticism

Scholars of all types of philosophy are fond of referring to philosophical traditions. But what does this mean? What counts as a tradition? In the Indian context one way to discuss a tradition is with the word darśana, which literally means Continue reading

Where is Philosophy?: A Response to Nicholas Tampio

Last week there was a call from political science professor Nicholas Tampio to narrowly define philosophy as a discipline responding either directly to Plato’s Republic or at least part of a self-consciously Socratic-Platonic tradition of inquiry.  I recommend reading Tampio’s essay, “Not Continue reading

Has Philosophy Lost Its Way? — Vaidya on the Case of Indian Philosophy

Anand Vaidya, a contributor here on the blog, has written a series of new posts over at the Blog of the APA (American Philosophical Association).  Anand is responding to some recent discussions about the value of philosophy as a discipline Continue reading

Ultimate reality in Hinduism, Buddhism (etc.): Some suggestions for a possible syllabus

A reader (Robert Gressis) asked me to give him some advice for a class on philosophy of religion in which he would (admirably) like to insert something more than “the typical western philosophy of religion”. He would be interested in Continue reading

Candrakīrti and Jayarāśi on Dignāga’s Epistemology (Part Two)

In Part One, I explained the critiques of Dignāga’s epistemology offered by Candrakīrti and Jayarāśi. In Part Two, I’ll consider whether these arguments create serious problems for Dignāga’s epistemology. I suspect that the two arguments are different in that Candrakīrti Continue reading

Some common prejudices about Indian Philosophy: It is time to give them up

Is Indian Philosophy “caste-ish”? Yes and no, in the sense that each philosophy is also the result of its sociological milieu, but it is not only that. Is Indian Philosophy only focused on “the Self”? Surely not.

Candrakīrti and Jayarāśi on Dignāga’s Epistemology (Part One)

In his Pramāṇasamuccaya, Dignāga claims that there are two means of knowledge (pramāṇas): perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna). Perception has as its object the particular (svalakṣana); inference has as its object the universal (sāmānyalakṣana). The key distinguishing feature between the two is Continue reading