Is there a Sanskrit word for “intelligence” (or any other word)?

A reader wrote me: I would like to know whether there is a similar term in Indian philosophy (sanskrit) for ‘Intelligence’. Can we equate it with the term prajñānam? The problem with such questions (I do not know about you, Continue reading

Book Announcement — Hinduism: A Contemporary Philosophical Investigation

Dear Indian Philosophy Bloggers and Readers I would like to share with you news of my in-press book. It is scheduled to be out in July, which is late to be considered for September teaching and research, so I thought Continue reading

A contemporary Prābhākara contextualism

In her recent post on theories of sentence meaning in Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā, Elisa talked about a possible “contemporary Prābhākara” viewpoint about sentence meaning: …a contemporary Prābhākara might suggest that some preliminary understanding of word-meaning is immediately denoted by each word, Continue reading

Proximity, semantic fitness and syntactic expectancy as criteria for the sentence meaning

Words (for the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā authors) get connected into a complex sentence meaning through proximity (sannidhi), semantic fitness (yogyatā) and syntactic expectancy (ākāṅkṣā). These three criteria correspond to the requirement of being uttered one after the other with no intervening Continue reading

Dissent among a Viśiṣṭādvaitin and a Mīmāṃsaka: What do Vedic words mean?

Within his Mīmāṃsā commentary, the Seśvaramīmāṃsā, Veṅkaṭanātha explicitly dissents from Śabara (also) in his commentary on Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtra (henceforth PMS) 1.1.31 on Vedic words seemingly expressing proper names, e.g., Prāvāhaṇi and Babara (which are used by opponents as an Continue reading

Did ṛṣis author the Veda? A Mīmāṃsā and Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta view about it

In his Seśvaramīmāṃsā (ad 1.1.29), Veṅkaṭanātha discusses the problem of the authorship of the Veda while being a Mīmāṃsaka, but also trying to condede something to theism. For instance, he is less straightforward than Mīmāṃsā authors in ruling out the Continue reading

Meanings of Words and Sentences in Mīmāṃsā

Mīmāṃsakas of both the Bhāṭṭa and the Prābhākara subschools refute the idea of a sphoṭa carrying the meaning and being different from what we experience, namely phonemes and words, since this contradicts the principle of parsimony and our common experience. Continue reading

Hermeneutics, “Ricoeurian” and “Jaiminīya,” and the Question of Writing

I am a big fan of Paul Ricoeur. It’s shame, I think, that he never learned Sanskrit, because he was deeply interested in a number of issues that were of critical importance to Indian thinkers: the production of meaning through Continue reading

Rājaśekhara on mīmāṃsā and ānvīkṣikī as two distinct types of philosophical śāstras—a guest post by Christophe Vielle

(I am grateful for the following learned and thought-provoking guest post I received from Christophe Vielle, dealing with an emic way to define “Philosophy” in the Indian context. EF) Rājaśekhara’s classification of śāstras in the Kāvyamīmāṃsā, adhyāya 2 (śāstra-nirdeśa)*, is Continue reading