To paraphrase a contemporary philosopher: ‘examples stick around in philosophy in a way they don’t in other fields such as linguistics.’ There is some truth to this. I cannot imagine a philosopher today who doesn’t know Frege’s famous problem: ‘the Continue reading Puzzles in Sanskrit Philosophy
Dear fellow readers, Hi. For my second blog post as the guest host for March 2021, I want to provide a digest version of my recent article in JHS titled: Commands and the Doctrine of the Apūrva in Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā, Continue reading Prabhākara’s Subversion of Śabara’s Theory of Human Motivational Behaviour
Dear fellow readers, Hi. My name is Patrick, and I’m a Doctoral Candidate at Cornell University. For the month of March 2021, I’ll be taking the lead in this blog series for graduate students to discuss their research. In this Continue reading Prābhākāra Mīmāṃsā and the Rise of Nyāya’s Philosophy of Language
What happens when commands clash? A standard devise to deal with the topic is the idea of taking one as a general rule and the other as a specific one. In Sanskrit, these are called, respectively, utsarga and apavāda. Mīmāṃsā Continue reading General and specific rules in Mīmāṃsā?
Why do people obey to commands? Because they are immediately inclined, in a behaviourist way, to obey? Or because they realise that the action commanded is an instrument to the realisation of a coveted goal? Or are there further explanations? Continue reading Why do people respond to commands?
Maṇḍana’s thesis is an answer to the problem of how to identify the core of a prescription. What makes people undertake actions? Kumārila’s śabdabhāvanā theory and Prabhākara’s kāryavāda had already offered their answers. Maṇḍana expands on Kumārila’s intuition about human Continue reading Maṇḍana’s intellectual theory of motivation
Within chapter 11 of his masterpiece, the Vidhiviveka `Discernment about prescription’, Maṇḍana identifies the core element which causes people to undertake actions. Maṇḍana expands on Kumārila’s intuition about human behaviour being always goal-oriented by offering a radical reductionist hypothesis. According Continue reading A preliminary understanding of Maṇḍana’s pratibhā
In this post, I will look at two instances in The Jasmine Vine of Reasoning (Yuktimallikā) where Vādirājatīrtha, a prominent 16th Cent. CE scholar of Dvaita Vedānta, uses principles from Mīmāṃsā to bolster his arguments. Mīmāṃsā, one of the six traditional darśanas in Indian Continue reading Vādirājatīrtha’s Use of Mīmāṃsā Principles
Śālikanātha is the main philosopher of the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā school after Prabhākara himself. In some sense, one could even say that he is more important than Prabhākara himself, since he is way more systematic than Prabhākara, and explores through his Continue reading Śālikanātha’s contribution
Śālikanātha discusses the definition of a source of knowledge (pramāṇa) at the beginning of his Pramāṇapārāyaṇa and analyses various criteria. First of all, he discusses the criterion of avisaṃvāditva ‘non deviation’ (used by Dharmakīrti and his school) and shows how Continue reading How to define valid cognition if you are Śālikanātha (analysis of various criteria)?