New Resource: The Deviant Philosopher

There’s a new resource for philosophy teachers called The Deviant Philosopher.  The site is developed by a team from the University of Oklahoma, which includes Amy Olberding, Wayne Riggs, Kelly Epley, and Seth Robertson.  From the site: The Deviant Philosopher is a Continue reading

What Counts as a Tradition in Indian Philosophy?: The Case of Skepticism

Scholars of all types of philosophy are fond of referring to philosophical traditions. But what does this mean? What counts as a tradition? In the Indian context one way to discuss a tradition is with the word darśana, which literally means Continue reading

A basic introduction to Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta_UPDATED

(I have been asked to write a short introduction to Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta and would like to test it on you, dear readers and fellow bloggers. Any comment or criticism would be more than welcome!) In its full-fledged form, the Viśiṣṭādvaita Continue reading

In search of a Lost Philosophical Dialog in Mithila: An interview with Pundit Kishorenath Jha (A guest post by Debajyoti Gangopadhyay) UPDATED

Pundit Kishorenath Jha is one among the last very few Naiyāyikas of note of Maithil origin (according to traditional sources also Udayana, Vācaspati and Śaṅkara Miśra were born in the same Madhubanī district of North Bihar). After retiring from Ganganath Continue reading

God and realism. Marginal notes on a workshop in Hawai’i, part 2

Can God as the perfect omniscient knower guarantee the possibility of a reality disidentified from all local perspectives and thus independent of them, though remaining inherently intelligible (by God Himself)? It depends on how one understands God. As discussed already Continue reading

Omniscience and realism: Marginal notes about a workshop in Hawai’i

A non-intelligible entity cannot be conceived to exist. But, if the world needs to be known in order to exist, we need to postulate a non-partial perspective out of which it can be known. Since the perspectives of all human Continue reading

The Mīmāṃsā approach to the sentence meaning as something to be done

According to Mīmāṃsā authors, and unlike Nyāya ones, Vedic sentences do not convey the existence of something, but rather that something should be done. This means that the entire Veda is an instrument of knowledge only as regards duties and Continue reading