For a lucky coincidence, two long term projects of mine reached completion almost at the same time. You can therefore read on the 2017 issue of the Journal of World Philosophies the (Open Access) papers on philosophy of language which Continue reading Open access papers on philosophy of language etc.
Why is the topic of omniscience relevant in Indian philosophy? Because of at least two concurring reasons. On the one hand, for schools like Buddhism and Jainism, it is a question of religious authority. Ascribing omniscience to the founders of Continue reading Again on omniscience: Why talking about it, God’s omniscience and some reasons to refute it
“Omniscience” (sārvajñya) assumes many different meanings in the various Indian philosophies. The understanding possibly most common in European and Anglo-American thought, which sees omniscience as including the knowledge of any possible thing in the past, present and future, is neither Continue reading First thoughts on omniscience in Indian thought
Scholars of all types of philosophy are fond of referring to philosophical traditions. But what does this mean? What counts as a tradition? In the Indian context one way to discuss a tradition is with the word darśana, which literally means Continue reading What Counts as a Tradition in Indian Philosophy?: The Case of Skepticism
(I have been asked to write a short introduction to Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta and would like to test it on you, dear readers and fellow bloggers. Any comment or criticism would be more than welcome!) In its full-fledged form, the Viśiṣṭādvaita Continue reading A basic introduction to Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta_UPDATED
Can God as the perfect omniscient knower guarantee the possibility of a reality disidentified from all local perspectives and thus independent of them, though remaining inherently intelligible (by God Himself)? It depends on how one understands God. As discussed already Continue reading God and realism. Marginal notes on a workshop in Hawai’i, part 2
According to Mīmāṃsā authors, and unlike Nyāya ones, Vedic sentences do not convey the existence of something, but rather that something should be done. This means that the entire Veda is an instrument of knowledge only as regards duties and Continue reading The Mīmāṃsā approach to the sentence meaning as something to be done
As part of my attempts to go beyond my confort zone, Wednesday and Thursday last week I enjoyed two days of full immersion in the Analytical Philosophy of Religion. In fact, the conference I was attending was about the ontological Continue reading Analytical Philosophy of Religion with Indian categories
Opponents coming from the Advaita field figure often in Yāmuna’s Ātmasiddhi, which shows that even before Rāmānuja Vaiṣṇava authors were taking seriously the challenge of Advaita. Even more interesting is the way Yāmuna answers to them. Let us see some Continue reading The subject as knower and doer in Yāmuna’s Ātmasiddhi
This issue of JIP is edited by Christopher Minkowski and has a special focus on Appayya Dīkṣita. Please see this link for contents.