The three main schools of Vedānta in South India—Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita, and Dvaita all center themselves around a similar canon of sacred texts, including the Vedas, Upaniṣads, Purāṇas, etc. Of such canonical scriptures, the Bhagavadgītā (BG) is regarded as authoritative in all three Continue reading Vedānta commentators on the Bhagavadgītā 2.46
The term adhikāra has multiple connotations in Sanskrit intellectual disciplines. It may be loosely translated as eligibility, but it includes within its scope questions of whether a person has a) the capacity to do something and b) the legitimate authority to do Continue reading Women and Adhikāra in Dvaita Vedānta
In this post, I will look at two instances in The Jasmine Vine of Reasoning (Yuktimallikā) where Vādirājatīrtha, a prominent 16th Cent. CE scholar of Dvaita Vedānta, uses principles from Mīmāṃsā to bolster his arguments. Mīmāṃsā, one of the six traditional darśanas in Indian Continue reading Vādirājatīrtha’s Use of Mīmāṃsā Principles
Hello everyone, I am Anusha Rao, a doctoral student in Religion at the University of Toronto. My thanks to Elisa and all the other board members for the opportunity to guest post here this month! I’d like to introduce my Continue reading Vādirājatīrtha and Doctrinal Development in Dvaita Vedānta
Continuing my reply to Evan Thompson, I will focus next on karma, because the reinterpretation of karma is central to my own eudaimonist Buddhism, and therefore it forms a focal point in Thompson’s critique. Karma is Thompson’s example of how Continue reading Is karma about why bad things happen to good people?
During the current pandemic almost all academic conferences have been canceled or postponed. In my own case, for instance, I was planning to have a busy April and May. I was supposed to present on women philosophers in ancient India Continue reading Indian Philosophy During the Pandemic: A Call for Examples and Ideas
We all know so many clever jokes about how hell should be preferred “because of the good company” and about how boring should heaven be. Let me take the chance to focus on the Śrīvaiṣṇava heaven, i.e., Vaikuṇṭha, and see Continue reading The theology of Vaikuṇṭha: Why should you want to be in heaven?
In the Nyāyasiddhāñjana and the Nyāyapariśuddhi, Veṅkaṭanātha discusses some fundamental ontological topics in order to distinguish his positions from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position. The Nyāyasūtra proposes a fundamental division of realities into dravya ‘substances’, guṇa ‘qualities’, and karman ‘actions’,1 with the Continue reading Inert and alive substances: Alternative classifications in Veṅkaṭanātha
“Thereupon, Gārgī Vācaknavī fell silent.” (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 3.6) I’m currently teaching a class called “Ancient Women Philosophers: India and Greece,” which is interesting for many reasons. I’ll get to some of those reasons in another post. In this post I want Continue reading Learning from Gārgī’s Silence
Within the Vidhiviveka, a Prābhākara-inclined Mīmāṃsaka debates with a Vedāntin about the meaning of Upaniṣadic sentences on the self. The Prābhākara insists that all sentences should be injunctive in character, and that Upaniṣadic sentences should also be interpreted in this Continue reading Could Upaniṣadic sentences be interpreted as prescriptions? A debate within Maṇḍana’s Vidhiviveka