Eudaimonist Buddhist modernism and the norm of authenticity

I now finish my present reply to Evan Thompson’s response. Let us return to Thompson’s general critique of Buddhist modernism. He doesn’t “reject using Buddhist ideas in the project of ameliorating suffering and promoting human flourishing.” On that, it seems, Continue reading Eudaimonist Buddhist modernism and the norm of authenticity

Naturalizing Buddhism and other traditions

In the previous three posts I aimed to show, contra Evan Thompson’s response, that the philosophical core of the karma doctrine does not have to do with explaining why bad things happen to good people, but rather with how good Continue reading Naturalizing Buddhism and other traditions

The workings of karma, naturalized and otherwise

As noted last time, I don’t identify the philosophical core of the concept of karma with its origins (which are pre-Buddhist), but with the way it functions in Buddhist philosophical texts. There, I submit, the core idea is indeed “that Continue reading The workings of karma, naturalized and otherwise

Is karma about why bad things happen to good people?

Continuing my reply to Evan Thompson, I will focus next on karma, because the reinterpretation of karma is central to my own eudaimonist Buddhism, and therefore it forms a focal point in Thompson’s critique. Karma is Thompson’s example of how Continue reading Is karma about why bad things happen to good people?

How to define valid cognition if you are Śālikanātha (analysis of various criteria)?

Śālikanātha discusses the definition of a source of knowledge (pramāṇa) at the beginning of his Pramāṇapārāyaṇa and analyses various criteria. First of all, he discusses the criterion of avisaṃvāditva ‘non deviation’ (used by Dharmakīrti and his school) and shows how Continue reading How to define valid cognition if you are Śālikanātha (analysis of various criteria)?

How to define valid cognition (against Buddhists) if you are Śālikanātha?

The beginning of Śālikanātha’s Pramāṇapārāyaṇa is dedicated to a discussion of how to define pramāṇa ‘instrument of valid cognition’. As it was custom since Dignāga’s innovation in the philosophical style, Śālikanātha quotes and refutes several positions. The first ones are Continue reading How to define valid cognition (against Buddhists) if you are Śālikanātha?