Ought entails can (and prohibitions imply possibility) in Kumārila (and Śabara)

Within TV ad 1.3.4, (Mimamsadarsana 1929-34, pp. 192–193), Kumārila discusses a seeming deontic conflict and solves it by appealing to the different responsibilities (adhikāra) of the various addressees. He explains that the prescription to learn the Vedas for 48 years Continue reading Ought entails can (and prohibitions imply possibility) in Kumārila (and Śabara)

CFP: Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism and Logic, 3rd World Congress on Logic and Religion

Keynote speakers: Purushottama Bilimoria (Uni Melbourne, San Francisco State Uni, RUDN University),Sachchidananda Mishra (ICPR, BHU Varanasi) Details:The aim of this workshop is to explore the philosophical and logical aspects pertaining to religion coming from the Hindu, Buddhist, and Jain perspectives. Continue reading CFP: Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism and Logic, 3rd World Congress on Logic and Religion

Mapping the territory: Sanskrit cosmopolis, 1500–today

There is a lot to do in the European intellectual history, with, e.g., major theories that await an improved understanding and connections among scholars that have been overseen or understudied. Using a simile, one might say that a lot of Continue reading Mapping the territory: Sanskrit cosmopolis, 1500–today

Answering the contemptible consequence problem

Hi all, this is Szymon. In previous posts, I presented the Dharmakīrtian approach to the liar paradox and introduced the contemptible consequence problem. Today, I will give five answers to this problem and tell you what I plan to do Continue reading Answering the contemptible consequence problem

The contemptible consequence problem

Hello again, this is Szymon, a PhD student researching the Dharmakīrtian approach to liar paradox. According to this approach—you can find more about it in my previous post—the liar sentence is ambiguous, unbelievable, and cannot express a warranted belief. There’s Continue reading The contemptible consequence problem

Dharmakīrti and liar paradox

Hello again, this is Szymon, a PhD student working on Buddhist logic. In my last post, I talked about the methodological background of my project. Today, I will tell you what Dharmakīrti says about liar-like sentences and how we can Continue reading Dharmakīrti and liar paradox