Three Debts and Five Sacrifices

My last two posts focused on some of the considerations that the dharmasūtra authors cite in support of the householder āśrama. As I mentioned, the householder’s payment of the three debts is central to these considerations. In this post, I Continue reading Three Debts and Five Sacrifices

Maṇḍana’s intellectual theory of motivation

Maṇḍana’s thesis is an answer to the problem of how to identify the core of a prescription. What makes people undertake actions? Kumārila’s śabdabhāvanā theory and Prabhākara’s kāryavāda had already offered their answers. Maṇḍana expands on Kumārila’s intuition about human Continue reading Maṇḍana’s intellectual theory of motivation

Because Time is not Self : On Ānandajñāna’s refutation of Kāla, A guest post by Satyan Sharma

Submitted to the blog by Satyan Sharma, Research scholar at the department of Sanskrit, Panjab University, (sharma.satyan@ymail.com) Because Time is not Self : On Ānandajñāna’s refutation of Kāla Abstract The conversation between Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika (NV) and Advaita Vedānta (AV) philosophers attract Continue reading Because Time is not Self : On Ānandajñāna’s refutation of Kāla, A guest post by Satyan Sharma

The Householder Debates in the Dharmasūtras: Another Solution

In a post here last week, I argued for an initial puzzle in the dharmasūtras of Āpastamba and Vasiṣṭha. Both authors argue that the four āśramas are equally legitimate. Their arguments for the importance of the householder, however, seem to Continue reading The Householder Debates in the Dharmasūtras: Another Solution

Natural and Artificial Intelligence, and Consciousness, Part II

The Indian tradition is replete with modeling of human experience. In the previous post I discussed how Sāṃkhya’s model of mind, body, and consciousness might be used to rethink the conceptualization of evolutionary theory and neuroscience. I argued that the Continue reading Natural and Artificial Intelligence, and Consciousness, Part II

The Householder Debates in the Dharmasūtras: An Initial Puzzle

The Householder Debates in the Dharmasūtras: An Initial Puzzle The dharmasūtras of Gautama and Baudhāyana argue that only the householder is legitimate. Āpastamba and Vasiṣṭha, in contrast, argue against the claim that the householder is less legitimate than the other Continue reading The Householder Debates in the Dharmasūtras: An Initial Puzzle

Summary study of Karmayoga

When teaching my World Philosophy course, I try to highlight the ways that Daoist notions of wu-wei, Stoic (and in particular, Epictetus’) notion of living in accordance with nature, and the Gītā’s idea of karmayoga are three ways to approach Continue reading Summary study of Karmayoga

Natural and Artificial Intelligence, and Consciousness, Part I – Jonathan Edelmann

I begin this post by overviewing some of the ways I have thought about evolutionary theory and neuroscience using Indian thought, especially Sāṃkhya-yoga and its interpretation in Puranic theology and philosophy. In the next post I will apply some of Continue reading Natural and Artificial Intelligence, and Consciousness, Part I – Jonathan Edelmann

Meta-ethics, essences, and the irreducibly normative: a question from an analytic philosopher

A friend who is an analytic philosopher wrote to me with the following question. I’d like to invite anyone with some expertise or suggestions to kindly say something in the discussions below. “I’m wondering if there are any figures or Continue reading Meta-ethics, essences, and the irreducibly normative: a question from an analytic philosopher