Thoughts on Realisms Interlinked by Arindam Chakrabarti/4

This post is part of a series discussing Arindam Chakrabarti’s Realisms Interlinked. The previous posts are available here, here and here. The last chapter (chapter 16) of the second part is a discussion of the Nyāya theories for the existence Continue reading Thoughts on Realisms Interlinked by Arindam Chakrabarti/4

Thoughts on Realisms interlinked by Arindam Chakrabarti/3

Main thesis: While we move from realism about objects to realism about subjects and other subjects, Arindam’s commitment to naïve realism decreases. Since I have discussed in the first two previous posts about how Arindam’s methodology makes him do philosophy Continue reading Thoughts on Realisms interlinked by Arindam Chakrabarti/3

Thoughts on Arindam Chakrabarti’s Realisms Interlinked / Part 2

Almost all the chapters I will deal with in this second post (“Part 1” in the book) are about a defence of objects. The next bunch of chapters will be about a defence of subjects and the last one will Continue reading Thoughts on Arindam Chakrabarti’s Realisms Interlinked / Part 2

Thoughts on Realisms interlinked by Arindam Chakrabarti 1/ [UPDATED]

Author: A philosopher of two worlds, pupil of amazing scholars of Nyāya and of Analytic philosophy, completely accomplished in both worlds in a way which is hard to repeat —Book: It puts together Arindam’s research of 27 years. Thus, it Continue reading Thoughts on Realisms interlinked by Arindam Chakrabarti 1/ [UPDATED]

Literature as representation and rasa

Sumana Roy, a professor of literature at Ashoka University near Delhi, wrote a wonderful recent essay in the Chronicle of Higher Education identifying significant problems with the way Indian literature is taught, in both American and Indian universities. In American Continue reading Literature as representation and rasa

The contemptible consequence problem

Hello again, this is Szymon, a PhD student researching the Dharmakīrtian approach to liar paradox. According to this approach—you can find more about it in my previous post—the liar sentence is ambiguous, unbelievable, and cannot express a warranted belief. There’s Continue reading The contemptible consequence problem

Dharmakīrti and liar paradox

Hello again, this is Szymon, a PhD student working on Buddhist logic. In my last post, I talked about the methodological background of my project. Today, I will tell you what Dharmakīrti says about liar-like sentences and how we can Continue reading Dharmakīrti and liar paradox

My project on Buddhist epistemology of logic—First guest post by Szymon Bogacz

Note by EF: This post is part of our series dedicated to younger colleagues presenting themselves and their research, like Manasicha Akepiyapornchai did here and Anusha Rao did here. For more on Szymon, see here. Hello everyone, my name is Continue reading My project on Buddhist epistemology of logic—First guest post by Szymon Bogacz