Kumārila on deities

Did Kumārila believe in the language-independent existence of deities? In their efficacy within sacrifices? I believe he did not. Sacrifices work independently of deities who at most might be Epicurean-like entities, with no function in human lives. For this purpose, Continue reading Kumārila on deities

Cognition of the self

How does one know about the self, according to the three main schools discussed in my last post? Buddhist Epistemological School (Dharmakīrti): the self does not exist. The only thing that exists is a stream (santāna) of causally linked momentary Continue reading Cognition of the self

Intro to Sanskrit philosophy

Background: This year I taught again a class on Sanskrit philosophy (for the first time since 2021). I only had 12 meetings, of three hours each, hence I had do made drastic choices. The following is the result of these Continue reading Intro to Sanskrit philosophy

Second Kumārila conference (2025)

The first Kumārila conference took place at the University of Toronto in 2024. You can read more about why we need to read and write more about this key Sanskrit philosopher here: https://elisafreschi.com/2025/02/28/kumarila-conference-2025/ The second Kumārila conference will take place Continue reading Second Kumārila conference (2025)

Veṅkaṭanātha on free will to surrender

Veṅkaṭanātha has to adapt the Mīmāṃsā approach to free will to his Vaiṣṇava commitment to the role of God’s grace. He thus concludes that humans are free in their intentions, although they need God’s consent to convert them into action. Continue reading Veṅkaṭanātha on free will to surrender

Rights in Mīmāṃsā and further steps in mapping the deontic horizon—Updated

I have been working for years on mapping the deontic space of Mīmāṃsā authors. In order to do that, I tried to find a balance between systematicity, for the purpose of which I need as many information as possible and Continue reading Rights in Mīmāṃsā and further steps in mapping the deontic horizon—Updated

Thinking about rights in Sanskrit philosophy

I started thinking about rights while working on permissions, because some deontic logicians think that permissions need to be also independent of prohibitions, in order to ground rights. Now, as I argued elsewhere, Mīmāṃsā permissions are always exceptions to previous Continue reading Thinking about rights in Sanskrit philosophy