A group blog of scholars exploring Indian philosophy
We concluded today a great workshop on Maṇḍana’s Vidhiviveka and these are my first comments on what we could establish. My deepest gratitude goes to all participants. (For more on the workshop, read here: https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/event/workshop-maṇḍana-on-ritual-duties/) Structure: vv. 2.1–2.6: Maṇḍana’s siddhānta Continue reading Quick summary of Maṇḍana’s view on sacrificial duties
Maṇḍana’s theory of commands centers around his attempt to reduce them to statements of instrumentality. Commanding to X to do Y would amount to say that Y is the instrument to realise a goal of X. Maṇḍana establishes (in his Continue reading Maṇḍana on sacrificial duties
How do Sanskrit philosophers deal with solipsism? Some Buddhist epistemologists just accepted it, as a necessary consequence of their idealism. The example of Ratnakīrti’s “Rejection of the existence of other continuous sequences [of causes and effects leading to the illusion Continue reading Solipsism in Sanskrit philosophy: Preliminary thoughts
Within TV ad 1.3.4, (Mimamsadarsana 1929-34, pp. 192–193), Kumārila discusses a seeming deontic conflict and solves it by appealing to the different responsibilities (adhikāra) of the various addressees. He explains that the prescription to learn the Vedas for 48 years Continue reading Ought entails can (and prohibitions imply possibility) in Kumārila (and Śabara)
There is a lot to do in the European intellectual history, with, e.g., major theories that await an improved understanding and connections among scholars that have been overseen or understudied. Using a simile, one might say that a lot of Continue reading Mapping the territory: Sanskrit cosmopolis, 1500–today
The case of combination variants like dadhi and dadhy is used by Nyāya authors as an evidence of the fact that words are produced and modified. Mīmāṃsā authors, who think that language is without beginning, need to respond to that Continue reading “dadhi and dadhy are two different words”
The book on Veṅkaṭanātha I am working on is an attempt of doing history of philosophy in the Sanskrit context, given that no agreed canon, chronology, list of main figures or main questions has been established for the history of Continue reading Reconstructing Viśiṣṭādvaitavedānta: Veṅkaṭanātha’s contribution
Medhātithi discusses corporeal punishments whenever Manu does, but in two different ways: At times (e.g., in his commentary on MDhŚā 9.248) he just repeats what Manu says, without adding further elaborations and without attempting a general argument about the overall Continue reading Medhātithi on corporeal punishment
In general, Medhātithi’s commentary systematizes the MDh. In the case of action and intention, he does his best to iron away seeming incongruities by explaining that intentional actions are liable to more blame than unintentional ones, which he accomplishes by Continue reading Medhātithi on intention and action
Is it possible to command someone who is already inclined to act according to Prabhākara? Bṛhatī ad 6.1.1 says na pravṛttapravartane prayogaḥ āmantraṇādiṣu vyabhicārāt, literally: “[Exhortative endings] are not used to promote people who are already active, because of the Continue reading Permissions for Prabhākara