A group blog of scholars exploring Indian philosophy
I have been working for years on reconstructing the deontic landscape of Mīmāṃsā, but at this point I realise that “landscape” might be a misleading metaphor. In fact, Mīmāṃsā authors were not just describing a natural scenario. They engineered a Continue reading Reconstructing the Mīmāṃsā townscape
I have been working for years on mapping the deontic space of Mīmāṃsā authors. In order to do that, I tried to find a balance between systematicity, for the purpose of which I need as many information as possible and Continue reading Rights in Mīmāṃsā and further steps in mapping the deontic horizon—Updated
The following are a few random notes on permissions which have not (yet) found a place in an article. 1. A colleague wondered whether the command my co-authors and I have been discussing in several articles on Mīmāṃsā and called Continue reading Further notes on Mīmāṃsā permission
I started thinking about rights while working on permissions, because some deontic logicians think that permissions need to be also independent of prohibitions, in order to ground rights. Now, as I argued elsewhere, Mīmāṃsā permissions are always exceptions to previous Continue reading Thinking about rights in Sanskrit philosophy
We concluded today a great workshop on Maṇḍana’s Vidhiviveka and these are my first comments on what we could establish. My deepest gratitude goes to all participants. (For more on the workshop, read here: https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/event/workshop-maṇḍana-on-ritual-duties/) Structure: vv. 2.1–2.6: Maṇḍana’s siddhānta Continue reading Quick summary of Maṇḍana’s view on sacrificial duties
Maṇḍana’s theory of commands centers around his attempt to reduce them to statements of instrumentality. Commanding to X to do Y would amount to say that Y is the instrument to realise a goal of X. Maṇḍana establishes (in his Continue reading Maṇḍana on sacrificial duties
How do Sanskrit philosophers deal with solipsism? Some Buddhist epistemologists just accepted it, as a necessary consequence of their idealism. The example of Ratnakīrti’s “Rejection of the existence of other continuous sequences [of causes and effects leading to the illusion Continue reading Solipsism in Sanskrit philosophy: Preliminary thoughts
Within TV ad 1.3.4, (Mimamsadarsana 1929-34, pp. 192–193), Kumārila discusses a seeming deontic conflict and solves it by appealing to the different responsibilities (adhikāra) of the various addressees. He explains that the prescription to learn the Vedas for 48 years Continue reading Ought entails can (and prohibitions imply possibility) in Kumārila (and Śabara)
There is a lot to do in the European intellectual history, with, e.g., major theories that await an improved understanding and connections among scholars that have been overseen or understudied. Using a simile, one might say that a lot of Continue reading Mapping the territory: Sanskrit cosmopolis, 1500–today
The case of combination variants like dadhi and dadhy is used by Nyāya authors as an evidence of the fact that words are produced and modified. Mīmāṃsā authors, who think that language is without beginning, need to respond to that Continue reading “dadhi and dadhy are two different words”