Hi all, this is Szymon. In previous posts, I presented the Dharmakīrtian approach to the liar paradox and introduced the contemptible consequence problem. Today, I will give five answers to this problem and tell you what I plan to do Continue reading Answering the contemptible consequence problem
Hello again, this is Szymon, a PhD student researching the Dharmakīrtian approach to liar paradox. According to this approach—you can find more about it in my previous post—the liar sentence is ambiguous, unbelievable, and cannot express a warranted belief. There’s Continue reading The contemptible consequence problem
Note by EF: This post is part of our series dedicated to younger colleagues presenting themselves and their research, like Manasicha Akepiyapornchai did here and Anusha Rao did here. For more on Szymon, see here. Hello everyone, my name is Continue reading My project on Buddhist epistemology of logic—First guest post by Szymon Bogacz
Paul Fuller’s The Notion of Diṭṭhi in Theravāda Buddhism, as its title might suggest, is a dry, abstract, technical monograph. It may also be one of the more spiritually beneficial books I have ever read. I suppose maybe both of Continue reading Right view vs. true statements
For some time now I have realized: it is time for me to write a book. It’s time to take ideas that I have circulated in blog-post form and develop them into a more systematic, coherent constructive argument. It has Continue reading Resolving cliffhangers in a book
Professor Eliot Deutsch, distinguished scholar of Indian philosophy, comparative philosophy, and aesthetics, has died. From an obituary by Roger Ames posted on the University of Hawai’i Department of Philosophy website. The life of Eliot Deutsch lies at the center of Continue reading Eliot Deutsch (1931-2020)
Śālikanātha discusses the definition of a source of knowledge (pramāṇa) at the beginning of his Pramāṇapārāyaṇa and analyses various criteria. First of all, he discusses the criterion of avisaṃvāditva ‘non deviation’ (used by Dharmakīrti and his school) and shows how Continue reading How to define valid cognition if you are Śālikanātha (analysis of various criteria)?
The beginning of Śālikanātha’s Pramāṇapārāyaṇa is dedicated to a discussion of how to define pramāṇa ‘instrument of valid cognition’. As it was custom since Dignāga’s innovation in the philosophical style, Śālikanātha quotes and refutes several positions. The first ones are Continue reading How to define valid cognition (against Buddhists) if you are Śālikanātha?
During the current pandemic almost all academic conferences have been canceled or postponed. In my own case, for instance, I was planning to have a busy April and May. I was supposed to present on women philosophers in ancient India Continue reading Indian Philosophy During the Pandemic: A Call for Examples and Ideas
The chapter on epistemology (tarkapāda) is the first chapter in the basic text of Mīmāṃsā, the Mīmāṃsāsūtra, but was presumably the last one added to the Mīmāṃsā hermeneutic enterprise.