Again on ahampratyaya in Kumārila (using Watson 2010 and 2020)

My previous post on Kumārila’s cognition of the I (here: https://elisafreschi.com/2026/02/15/does-kumarila-accept-i-cognition-as-a-kind-of-perception/) was part of an ongoing conversation with Alex Watson, who patiently prompted me to read or re-read (respectively) his 2010 (“Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha’s Elaboration of Self-Awareness (svasaṃvedana)…”) and 2020 (“Four Continue reading Again on ahampratyaya in Kumārila (using Watson 2010 and 2020)

Does Kumārila accept I-cognition as a kind of perception?

Kumārila is an extremely systematic thinker. Thus, if there is a seeming contradiction in Kumārila’s thought, it is likely the case that the contradiction is only a seeming one and that it can be solved. In the case at stake, Continue reading Does Kumārila accept I-cognition as a kind of perception?

Does liberation entail disembodiment? A guest post by Susanta Bhattacharya

Susanta Bhattacharya, a doctoral candidate in Indian philosophy in Kraków, Poland, published in Journal of Indian Philosophy earlier this year and asked us to share a summary. The full title of the piece is “Does Liberation Entail Disembodiment? Re-examining the Continue reading Does liberation entail disembodiment? A guest post by Susanta Bhattacharya

Cognition of the self

How does one know about the self, according to the three main schools discussed in my last post? Buddhist Epistemological School (Dharmakīrti): the self does not exist. The only thing that exists is a stream (santāna) of causally linked momentary Continue reading Cognition of the self

Snakes wrongly grasped: on the psychedelic experiences of Musk and Manson

If Nāgārjuna, the great Madhyamaka Buddhist philosopher, is known for anything, it’s his doctrine of the emptiness (śūnyatā) of all things. But in his most famous work, Nāgārjuna warns his audience about emptiness: “Misperceived emptiness ruins a person of dull Continue reading Snakes wrongly grasped: on the psychedelic experiences of Musk and Manson