One of the reasons Buddhists emphasize the idea of non-self so much, I think, is they see the kind of danger that can emerge from self-focused approaches like expressive individualism. That danger is when we identify with our bad qualities in a way that stops us from getting better. Buddhists emphasize the lack of an essential self so that we can shed our bad qualities, become better than we are.
Bronwyn Finnigan takes the importance of self-transformation as a key reason Buddhists advocate non-self. It is the lack of essence or permanence to the self that makes possible the Third Noble Truth:
The third ‘truth’ affirms that suffering can cease. It is possible to change from a state of pervasive suffering to one of happiness or well-being. Why does the Buddha think this is true? Because he thinks that nothing exists permanently, everything depends for its existence on causes and conditions. It follows that if one changes the causes and conditions of some effect, one changes the effect. This provides a guideline for the possibility of self-transformation. Psychological change is possible if one changes the relevant causes and conditions. In order to transform one’s psychological character in some respect, one needs to alter the causes and conditions of that aspect of character.
Amber Carpenter, relatedly, looks to a passage in the Avijjapaccaya Sutta that proclaims, “If there is the view, ‘The soul and the body are the same,’ there is no living of the holy life; and if there is the view, “The soul is one thing, the body is another,’ there is no living of the holy life.” Carpenter describes this as the “Moral Improvement Argument”. It is essential that we get better, and whether we identify a self with its qualities or with something independent of its qualities, either way we cannot improve:
On the one hand, if I am identical to all the various modes, moments and characteristics ordinarily thought to constitute or belong to the self, then I am the bad qualities as well as the good ones, the worse as much as the better. I cannot claim allegiance to only the subset of attractive properties and say that only these are “me”, for “I” am the totality. On the other hand, neither can we instead suppose the self is an entity distinct from these various characteristics, unqualified by them. For then when I become more generous, say, there might be something better now than it was before (there is generosity now where there was meanness before), but this cannot be “me”, because the I which is eternal and independent of conditions cannot change at all. (26)
From this, Carpenter takes the strong conclusion that “Therefore, if we are committed to moral improvement being even possible, we must reject the existence of self.” (26) I do not think we need to go that far. Things change, and people change, and we can speak of both as existent – conventionally. But we need to acknowledge that change as fundamental to whatever sort of existence they have. An existentialist Buddhism, as I think of it, requires that we acknowledge all things, and especially our selves, as empty in the sense of being dependently originated – subject to causes and conditions. This critique of self is one of the most important ways that this approach plays out in practice.
For self-improvement to happen, it is important not just that the self be mutable but that it be divisible. We must be able to make distinctions within the mind – and, perhaps most importantly, within the given mind. We start where we are, and where we are does provide the value context for where we’re going, for the self we discover or co-create. But where we are is also full of harmful tendencies that interfere with those values, tendencies from which it is essential that we dereify and disidentify. And it is on this point where non-self becomes not merely a theoretical but a practical critique of expressive individualism: it recognizes how dangerous it is to cling to “this is me!” The idea of a true fixed self does not allow that self to change and improve: to say I have been angry and self-pitying but now I will not be.
Now expressive individualism contains multitudes, as one of its advocates famously put it: there are many different expressive individualist approaches that do not all agree with each other. And that difference is crucial, because some of those approaches are more Buddhist-friendly than others.
Recent versions of expressive individualism have unfortunately come to emphasize the “true self” as something rigid and unchanging – including even its bad parts. This approach is perhaps especially visible in a prominent view of transgender identity, which treats being trans as something you always were, an immutable aspect of your soul – born this way. Thus there is often an expectation – encouraged, I’m told, by practices of medical “gatekeeping” that judge who is and isn’t eligible for transgender medical procedures – that every transwoman will have a story of playing with mom’s dresses and makeup at age four. That story certainly doesn’t fit my life, and there are plenty of others it doesn’t fit either. Its view of trans identity as eternal and essential doesn’t serve us well.
But there is an alternate version of expressive individualism, one which is made clearest in the subtitle of Nietzsche’s Ecce Homo: “How one becomes what one is.” Here, our individuality remains something of the highest ethical importance; Nietzsche proclaims “Hear me! For I am such and such a person. Above all, do not mistake me for someone else!” Yet that individuality is something narrative, something we co-create with others and with our natural and social environment over the course of our lives. It is this strand of expressive individualism that can agree with Buddhists that the self is divisible, heteronomous, and especially mutable. And that is crucial, because a mutable true self is an improvable true self. An eternal true self will forever be mired in suffering.
The entire confusion in the present context arises because of NOT understanding what a person’s true self is. Expressed extensively in ancient Indian texts, our true self is our soul. This has been extensively detailed in the Shrimad Bhagwat Gita. According to the Shrimad Bhagwat Gita, our soul is also the carrier of our intelligence. Therefore, our self is also comprised of our own Intelligence; on the other hand, the intelligence is comprised of Satwa, Rajas, and Tamas qualities. In addition to human intelligence, for which modern science does not even have a universally accepted definition, it is also comprised of approximately 26 qualities. These include basic intelligence, consciousness, a sense of forgiveness, a sense of motherhood, a sense of patience, and so on. These have been listed out in Shri Durga Saptashati. The intelligence is not just the capacity to analyse, it is also the patience. In addition to the Bhava of a person. Both intelligence and Patience have three characteristics of Satwa, Rajas, and Tamas, again extensively described in the Shrimad Bhagwad Gita. Inherited from previous births, the level of these three qualities varies from individual to individual at the time of birth, and it also continues to vary in every moment of every individual’s life. This effectively defines the complete self of an individual. We can therefore understand how complex it is to truly understand human intelligence, which is a complex phenomenon, and that also defines the self of an individual. Definitely, each and every individual’s self or intelligence is unique. This knowledge also forms one of the core fundamentals of ancient Hindu knowledge, the Upanishads and Vedanta. Since this fundamental knowledge has not been understood, all the theories put up by various philosophers over the centuries are erroneous. Next, what is self-improvement? Self-improvement is primarily, therefore, to correct and enhance our own intelligence. How do we correct our own intelligence? Shrimad Devi Bhagwad Puran clearly describes that one must strive to enhance the Satwa intelligence, maintain the Rajas intelligence, and reduce the Tamas intelligence to make ourselves better individuals. This is also raising our own selves to higher levels. Satwa intelligence can be enhanced by developing the control of our senses. Tamas intelligence can be reduced by following the five fundamental principles of being human. These include the following – following the truth always, two Ahimsa, that is not tormenting or killing INNOCENT living beings, Brahmcharya, that is not making sexual contact before marriage and after marriage being faithful to your partner. Four and five- not stealing and not grabbing other people’s property. Today we see that the world is moving in an entirely opposite direction. Once we understand our true self a whole lot of problems that the world is facing today will be solved.
Thank you, Sandhya, this is a great post. I tend to agree with you that Amber’s conclusion is too far-fetched, although I understand why one would get there, given the persistent substantialism about the ātman of other Sanskrit thinkers. But Kumārila clearly says that one’s ātman is liable to change, like one’s body from childhood to adult age (and we can clearly influence the development of our bodies, e.g., through training, eating etc.).
Dear Elisa, I respect what you are saying. But what I have said is not my thinking; what I have said is not my far-fetched thinking. I can cite substantial evidence in respect to what I have claimed. I have also presented the same in my book, Sanatan Dharma: A Complete Scientific Analysis. My entire theory is based upon research work carried out in modern scientific laboratories. I am myself a qualified Engineer in Electrical and Electronics Engineering and have studied more than 450 ancient scriptures over the last fifty years. My hypothesis is based upon this research and I can give direct evidence from scriptures.
That’s interesting to hear about Kumārila, since it’s so different from the Advaita perspective where the real ātman is the unchanging ultimate: I’m not used to hearing about a view of the ātman that says it’s real but changes. Is there dialogue – does Kumārila critique an Uttara Mīmāṃsā view of the ātman at all, or vice versa?
Kumārila falls in a long series of critiques mostly directed against the Carvaka
mechanists or materialists. I noticed this recently looking to trace the fragments. Kumārila differs from the older Mīmāṃsā also I’m admitting the Puranas, and the literary manner of interpretation appropriate to them, which is also more appropriate for Sakta, Saivist and Vaisnava traditions, as for chronology. With all this lived history comes a sense of historical changes continually and variously ongoing, drawinng individuals into joining the process. And with the later Puranas compiled for pilgrims visiting the new temples, you have social staging of narratives of personal spiritual seeking and discovery. Quite a few Buddhist communities in India then merged back into the Hindu fold, but may now be seen emerging again from the new currents of Hindu nationalism.
There was no Advaita Vedānta in the philosophical arena by Kumārila’s time. His interlocutors are Buddhist epistemologists and Naiyāyikas. The Upaniṣads are mentioned, but interpreted within the Mīmāṃsā framework.
Hm, OK. I think of Gauḍapāda (and Bhartṛprapañca from Bhedābheda Vedānta) as being 6th century and Kumārila 7th – do you disagree with that dating? Or was it just that Kumārila didn’t respond to Gauḍapāda because he wasn’t important enough at the time or was in a distant location?
Thank you for your interesting post, but I do not agree with your conclusion. In many Hindu and Jain philosophies there is a distinction between the real self, which is perfect and immutable, and the unreal one, the relative person, with which we ignorantly identify ourselves. Tipically, the moral and spiritual transformation of the individual is a gradual process starting with the develpment of moral virtues (non-violence, truthfulness, non-stealing, etc) and the fulfilment of social duties, follows with ascetic practices and concludes with contemplative disciplines. This paths bring about the realization that I am not this psychophysical person and the attainment of liberation or emancipation. This is just an example of how an eternal and immutable concept of the true self may be compatible with a moral and spiritual transformation. What changes is the relative self, not the absolute one. Best regards.
I think that’s right. After all, the Advaita ātman is so close to Buddhist emptiness that Śaṅkara got called a crypto-Buddhist. But both are very different from the modern “born this way” approach, that views gay or trans identity or even mental illness as a part of who we fundamentally or ultimately are. That’s what my critique is directed against.