New issue of Sophia devoted to Indian Philosophy

Sophia, 57.4 (March -December 2018) has been published. Edited by Christian Coseru, the issue theme is “Engaging Buddhism Philosophically”. Many papers, including Coseru’s own thorough introduction, are devoted to themes arising out of Jay Garfield’s book Engaging Buddhism. Other papers include reflections Continue reading New issue of Sophia devoted to Indian Philosophy

NDPR review of Jonardon Ganeri’s Attention, Not Self

Review by Sebastian Watzl, University of Oslo Why should we study the philosophical ideas of someone who lived many centuries ago, in a far-away part of the world, and in a highly different cultural context? One reason is to expand one’s Continue reading NDPR review of Jonardon Ganeri’s Attention, Not Self

“Indian philosophy” vs. “Buddhist ethics”

It is not especially controversial to say that ethics is a branch of philosophy. I’ve occasionally heard people dispute that claim, but mostly on the grounds that ethics extends beyond philosophy per se, to narrative and the like; few would Continue reading “Indian philosophy” vs. “Buddhist ethics”

The psychological case for disengaged Buddhism

My project on disengaged Buddhism has now been submitted to a journal. It’s undergone several revisions by this point. One of the most important such revisions was suggested unanimously by BU’s magnificent CURA seminar. In an earlier draft had attempted Continue reading The psychological case for disengaged Buddhism

Alternative theisms and atheisms (part 1)

One of the main advantages of dealing with worldviews other than the one you grew up in is the fact that you are exposed to doubts and alternatives. One of such cases regards the nebulous category of religion (to which Continue reading Alternative theisms and atheisms (part 1)

Buddhaghosa on seeing things as they are (3)

My continuing dispute with Maria Heim and Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad, over the ideas of Buddhaghosa, now returns to where it began: the distinction between ultimate (paramattha) and conventional (sammuti or vohāra). Heim and Ram-Prasad admit that for some Buddhist traditions these Continue reading Buddhaghosa on seeing things as they are (3)

Buddhaghosa on seeing things as they are (1)

Earlier this year I examined the classic Pali Milindapañhā dialogue and its claim that while one can speak of oneself as a “convention” (vohāra), ultimately (paramattha) a person is not found. I referred in passing to the Visuddhimagga (Path of Continue reading Buddhaghosa on seeing things as they are (1)