A group blog of scholars exploring Indian philosophy
Defenders of cross-cultural mystical experience are right to note that in many widely varying cultures, respected sages have referred to the experience of an ultimate nonduality: a perception that everything, including oneself, is ultimately one. But one might also then Continue reading Experiencing different ultimate unities
I recently received a note from Prof. Nirmalya Chakraborty (Rabindra Bharati University) about an exciting new digital library. It includes three categories: Navya-Nyāya Scholarship in Nabadwip, Philosophers of Modern India, and Twentieth Century Paṇḍitas of Kolkata. You can find the Continue reading Digital Library Project, Bhaktivedanta Research Center (Kolkata)
How do Sanskrit philosophers deal with solipsism? Some Buddhist epistemologists just accepted it, as a necessary consequence of their idealism. The example of Ratnakīrti’s “Rejection of the existence of other continuous sequences [of causes and effects leading to the illusion Continue reading Solipsism in Sanskrit philosophy: Preliminary thoughts
I wanted to reflect a bit more on my debate with Charles Goodman at Princeton this November. (If you haven’t seen it yet, here’s the video of the debate and our handouts.) I don’t think either of us would consider Continue reading Honing in on a disagreement
Douglas L. Berger. Indian and Intercultural Philosophy: Personhood, Consciousness, and Causality. viii + 231 pp., London, New York, and Dublin: Bloomsbury Academic. 2021. $115 (hardback). In the introduction of Indian and Intercultural Philosophy Berger notes: “In certain respects, a number Continue reading Book Review of Indian and Intercultural Philosophy: Personhood, Consciousness, and Causality by Douglas L. Berger (Reviewed by Chris Rahlwes)
Medhātithi discusses corporeal punishments whenever Manu does, but in two different ways: At times (e.g., in his commentary on MDhŚā 9.248) he just repeats what Manu says, without adding further elaborations and without attempting a general argument about the overall Continue reading Medhātithi on corporeal punishment
In general, Medhātithi’s commentary systematizes the MDh. In the case of action and intention, he does his best to iron away seeming incongruities by explaining that intentional actions are liable to more blame than unintentional ones, which he accomplishes by Continue reading Medhātithi on intention and action
This post is part of a series discussing Arindam Chakrabarti’s Realisms Interlinked. The previous posts are available here, here and here. The last chapter (chapter 16) of the second part is a discussion of the Nyāya theories for the existence Continue reading Thoughts on Realisms Interlinked by Arindam Chakrabarti/4
Main thesis: While we move from realism about objects to realism about subjects and other subjects, Arindam’s commitment to naïve realism decreases. Since I have discussed in the first two previous posts about how Arindam’s methodology makes him do philosophy Continue reading Thoughts on Realisms interlinked by Arindam Chakrabarti/3
Patrick O’Donnell makes several interesting comments disputing my claim that for most classical Indian Buddhists “the causes of suffering are primarily mental.” I think they’re worth responding to at length, so I’ll take two posts to do so: this week Continue reading Suffering’s mental causes are not merely conventional