Mantras and the inadequacy of language (guest post by Dominik Haas)

Thank you, Elisa, Amod, and Ethan, for giving me the opportunity to share my thoughts on your fantastic blog! I’m a researcher in the field of South Asian Studies working with Vedic and Sanskrit texts. Since writing my dissertation on the Gāyatrī-Mantra, my research has focused on mantras. In 2022, I was involved in the organization of the workshop “Mantras: Sound, Materiality, and the Body” (see the report). At that workshop, my colleague Georgi Krastev made some remarks on the problems that arise when “mantra” is conceptualized as a category with discrete boundaries. These remarks have had a great impact on my thinking about mantras.

Over the last few years, I have developed an approach to the subject that has helped me deal with a number of questions that have haunted mantra studies for a long time:

What are mantras? Are mantras language? How do they work?

These questions (seemingly) require long, complex, and nuanced answers, and the academic literature one should engage with and refer to in order to answer them is vast. In this blog post, I won’t even attempt to provide such answers. What I offer here are just my own thoughts and ideas, not elaborate scholarly theories. But perhaps, even in this unrefined form, they can help others who are grappling with the fundamental questions of mantra studies – not by providing answers to these questions, but by offering an alternative approach to them.

What are mantras?

Defining the concept “mantra” is notoriously difficult – or rather, famously impossible. Jan Gonda (“The Indian Mantra,” Oriens 1963: 246) confidently stated that

although it must be conceded that in particular contexts, which have come into existence in different centuries and in different communities the various aspect of the concepts were differently emphasized, there is on the other hand no denying that the term has in the course of time and notwithstanding its varied application kept a definite semantic kernel.

How could one identify such a “definite semantic kernel”? In fact, throughout history, the word “mantra” (and its cognates, derivatives, and translations) has been used to denote such a wide variety of phenomena that finding the lowest common denominator is hard. One might think of the stereotypical mantra as a brief, fixed Sanskrit formula that is attributed a special religious or magical power. However, among mantras, there is considerable variation in length, modifiability, and language. Not everything that is called a mantra is brief, fixed, and immutable; many mantras are composed in languages other than Sanskrit, and many practitioners would deny that the mantras they use have anything to do with religion or magic.

Moreover, the Vedic/Sanskrit term mántra itself has variants and translations in many languages, e.g., Tamil mantiram, English “mantra” (historically also “muntru” and “mantram”), Tibetan sngags, Chinese 真言 zhēn yán, and so forth. It is obvious that these terms cannot be synonymous in the sense that all of them have identical denotations and connotations.

There exists no systematic and comprehensive study of what exactly terms such as mántra, mantiram, or “mantra” have encompassed (and what not) in various cultures and traditions in different historical periods, or how they have related to similar terms (vidyā, dhāraṇī, maṅgala, etc.). In the absence of such data, defining “mantra” as one lexeme, let alone as one category with discrete boundaries, is an unattainable goal. While most will agree that a typical mantra is somehow connected to speech and sound and that it is supposed to achieve a certain effect, this can hardly be called “a definite semantic kernel.”

Hard-pressed as they are to provide answers, scholars and educators often define “mantra” on the basis of whatever kinds of mantras they happen to know, and in doing so emphasize aspects and associations that happen to be prevalent in the language they are writing in. In English, for example, “mantra” is strongly associated with repetition, fixedness, religion, and spirituality. For many practitioners and scholars, repetitivity is a key feature of mantras (cf. my forthcoming article “New Directions in Mantra Studies: Exploring the Emergence of Mantra Repetition,” ARGOS *2025).

In Early Vedic, in contrast, mántra denoted the product of the poets – usually entire hymns, and not just brief formulas. These hymns were certainly recited repeatedly in the process of memorization, but not in performance (moreover, when composing hymns, the Ṛgvedic poets even avoided repeating material from other hymns verbatim). Thus, the two concepts “mantra” and mántra are just as different from each other as, for example, “poem” and “spell.”

How should we deal with such contradictions?

Let us imagine an ideal scenario, one in which we can approach reality without any preconceived notions and labels, more or less like an infant with the cognitive abilities of an adult. Approaching reality as something entirely new, one could group the elements on the basis of how similar they are to each other, ignoring what they are traditionally called or what they are usually associated with. Only after this process is completed, one could think about drawing a circle around some of them, thus delimiting categories of things with more or less fixed boundaries. One could then think about labeling and using them for heuristic purposes, while always remaining aware that their boundaries are completely arbitrary. In this way, one could arrive at a model of reality that is as truthful, useful, and adaptable as possible.

It is of course completely unrealistic to pursue such an approach.

Our experience of reality is always shaped by preconceptions, and updating categories or getting rid of useless ones often fails because of our own stubbornness and inertia as well as that of our fellow human beings. All we can do is try our best.

As the example above already illustrates, the idea that mantra is a category that can be used in any scholarly discourse without defining it properly is dubious. Arguably, there exists no one “semantic kernel” – thus no one category “mantra” – that we can somehow discover or reconstruct by studying mantras from various times and traditions.

For this reason, we should drop the idea of such a category, thus starting from scratch (insofar as this is possible). Instead of trying to find out what the essence of mantras is, it might be more advantageous to identify recurrent aspects and properties and gather entities characterized by them in order to be able to make meaningful comparisons. In doing so, it makes sense to start with entities that have been labeled or treated as a “mantra” (or mántra, sngags, etc.) – if only for heuristic reasons. Looking at such entities, there are indeed a number of such aspects and properties that recur so often that they deserve closer study. As I will show below, in the case of entities labeled “mantras” (etc.), this can be their association with language and the principle according to which they are supposed to work.

If we do not step back far enough from what seems to be one incomprehensible and multifaceted phenomenon, we run the risk of misinterpreting reality as well as misunderstanding each other. Especially in the case of “mantras,” we should always assume that the notion we are dealing with differs from person to person and from source to source. In many conversations with knowledgeable colleagues I have been confronted with the idea that the interlocutor and I (and potentially even others) know what we are talking about, and that all that remains to be discussed are facets and aspects of one and the same phenomenon. In fact, there are several phenomena, some of which happen to share the same label. As fascinating as it may be, the idea of a single category “mantra” should be dropped as soon as we start speaking about mantras.

Are mantras language?

The answer to this question depends on how mantras are defined. For the sake of argument, let us define language as a system whose primary function is to convey information and to make those who have the power of interpreting language think, feel, or do something specific (i.e., they are so-called speech acts). The primary form of language in the case of humans is verbal, that is, it is characterized by sequences of orally produced sounds. For language to work, there needs to be at least one being capable of producing and/or interpreting it in a manner that sufficiently conforms to its grammatical rules. The typical case is when two or more people converse in the same language with the goal of conveying information, but language is also used when individuals speak to themselves or read or write texts – all of which can be in their native language or another language, correctly or with mistakes. In my view, the crucial aspect in all these cases is that language is meant to mediate between intelligent agents.

As I have argued, the notion that all “mantras” are a linguistic category is untenable, because they do not form one category at all. Most entities called “mantra” are indeed associated with language: most of them clearly have a verbal form, and many convey information and/or perform an action. However, not all of them seem to work in this way, which is why some doubt has been cast on their status as language proper. In particular, their efficacy is often not believed to depend on their being understood, even if their content is perfectly comprehensible and perhaps even appropriate in the respective communication situation. Paradoxically, mantras are generally even supposed to be superior to normal language. How can this be explained?

How do mantras work?

When looking at religious texts (in the broadest sense) from all over the world, one recurring aspect stands out, namely what I propose to call the “superlinguistic principle.” This principle consists in the idea or belief that a text – that is, a fixed verbal sequence – may achieve a certain effect through a mechanism that differs in some way from, or surpasses, that of normal speech. While other manifestations of language such as prayers or incantations are intended as a means of communication and presuppose that there is a conscious being who receives the message (e.g., a deity), certain texts are supposed to become effective regardless of whether they are understood by anyone. They are “superlinguistic” in that they do not mediate between intelligent agents, as normal language does.

Exactly how the superlinguistic principle works varies from case to case. For example, the user of a text may believe that the language it is composed in has a special power, that there is a paranormal or magical connection between the words of the formula and the objects they refer to, or that the sounds of the formula create vibrations that affect the mind or soul of the reciter (or, to give another example, the molecules in an object). We can easily imagine cases where a persuasive person or text is able to make someone believe in such a potency by providing a plausible theory.

However, I would argue that belief in the superlinguistic principle in many cases precedes explanations or can be entertained without them. It is possible to believe in the superlinguistic power of a certain text without knowing how it works; such belief is not necessarily dependent on intricate theories. Nor does it necessarily depend on the form, function, or content of the text. It is, in a way, a paratextual element.

This does not mean that textual content and superlinguistic potency never interact. In fact, the content of a text may even strengthen the belief of its user in its efficacy, and the belief in its efficacy may inspire a user to think about its content. The origin, language, form, and recitation style can be supporting factors, too; in South Asia, for example, a Sanskrit formula that has a certain structure (e.g., om + the name of a deity) is much more likely to be considered superlinguistic. But even in an environment where there are ideas about what a superlinguistic text should look like, superlinguistic power may also ascribed to texts that don’t conform to these ideas (we may, for example, imagine a traditional Hindu priest who believes in the power of a curse spoken in Arabic).

I can think of various motivations for developing a belief in the superlinguistic principle. One of them is the desire to avoid the uncertainties and risk of communication. When speaking with – or to – a conscious being, there is always a chance that this being will not respond or react in the way one wishes. This applies to communication with human beings (as everybody knows) just as much as it applies to communication with deities, even if this exchange is, in fact, unilateral.

If I ask a colleague to turn down the heater, there is a chance I’ll be turned down, whereas if I do it myself, I can at least expect the room temperature to go down (if environmental conditions don’t prevent it). Similarly, a deity may decide to fulfil or not fulfil the wishes for which a devotee has prayed. In other words, when applying the superlinguistic principle, you are not trying to convince, persuade, or cajole your interlocutor to be benevolent and act in accordance with your intentions or wishes. Rather, you expect your words and sounds to become effective through a different, more powerful and secure, mechanism.

Another reason to resort to the superlinguistic principle is because your goal cannot possibly be achieved through normal communication, be it the cure from a physical ailment, the attainment of superhuman powers, a better reincarnation after death, and so forth. Such goals may, at best, be granted by a superhuman being, but as mentioned above, communication with superhuman beings is not without risks. Moreover, depending on the religion, there might not be a superhuman being that is willing to fulfil all kinds of wishes, because the wish may be unethical or against other divinely-sanctioned regulations (e.g., wishing for the death of a relative, obtaining superhuman powers or forbidden substances, etc.).

The presence or absence of belief in the superlinguistic principle is a factor that may help in collecting related or comparable entities, and one could even define “mantra” as a text (especially if it is comparatively brief) that is believed to function according to the superlinguistic principle. If we adopt this perspective, we will begin to find superlinguistic, mantra-like texts in many regions and cultures. All over the world, there are formulas, spells, prayers, and so forth that are believed to be superior to normal speech. The belief in the superlinguistic principle seems to be at least as widespread as the belief in superhuman beings.

Collecting and comparing superlinguistic texts not only promises to lead to interesting insights, but will also reveal that the impression that all “mantras” taken together form a unique cultural phenomenon is an illusion. While many individual mantras, mantra systems, and mantra theories are indeed unique and worth studying, superlinguistic texts are a universal phenomenon. Their development appears to be a reaction to one of the numerous limitations that characterize human existence, namely the inadequacy of ordinary language. Superlinguistic texts are supposed to fulfil the “the dream of a natural language,” as Robert Yelle put it (Explaining Mantras, Routledge: 2003, p. 2); they speak to the desire of humans to maximize their agency.

About Dominik A. Haas

Dominik A. Haas is the author of a monograph on the history of the Gāyatrī-Mantra as well as a translation and text-linguistic study of the Kaṭha-Upaniṣad. He is currently a member of the FWF-funded Cluster of Excellence “EurAsian Transformations” at the Austrian Academy of Sciences and an external collaborator of ERC-funded synergy project “MANTRAMS” (Vienna, Tübingen, Oxford).

About elisa freschi

My long-term program is to make "Indian Philosophy" part of "Philosophy". You can follow me also on my personal blog: elisafreschi.com, on Academia, on Amazon, etc.

8 Replies to “Mantras and the inadequacy of language (guest post by Dominik Haas)”

  1. Thank you, Dominik, for an insightful post on something I have never thought about!

    I would like some clarification on what exactly your characterization of a mantra is meant to be.

    Let us suppose that, broadly, mantras are texts believed to function through some superlinguistic principle. As I am reading this (which may be completely off the mark), this is supposed to provide us with criteria to identify whether an occurrent token speech act (written or oral or otherwise) is an instance of a mantra.

    There is an obvious question and rejoinder to such a condition: whose belief? The utterer’s belief.

    As you have noted, unlike ordinary speech acts (say asking or vowing), mantras seem not to require almost anything in the content meaning of what is uttered. The problem of underdetermination of the illocutionary force by the content is even more extreme here. It seems that here, we resort to saying that the intention of the utterer is what determines the illocutionary force (call this naive intentionalism).

    Clearly, though, a complete agnostic in the superlinguistic principle can perform speech acts of mantra recitations (consider an artist painting mantras and selling them). Further, suppose I have no knowledge of a language X. Suppose further that I (falsely) believe the phrase ‘p’ has a super linguistic effect of bringing water. However, it turns out that ‘p’ just means ‘Can I please have water’ in X, and people bring me water anyway. My utterance of p would clearly not be a case of a mantra (even though I have the belief that it works superlinguistically). This condition then seems to be neither sufficient nor necessary for mantras.

    Instead, one might take the Austinian picture. Shared beliefs (intentions) of a linguistic or religious community ‘ground’ facts about the conventions of mantras. A token speech act is a mantra just in case a convention exists in this particular linguistic/religious context, according to which it is a mantra. This is a second-order intentionalism.

    Which version of intentionalism is your characterization? (Of course, I could be entirely wrong in reading your post this way)

    Rather, more broadly, I would be interested to understand how your view (which I seem to understand as an intentionalism) is to be contrasted with functionalism about mantras, i.e., an account providing identity conditions for mantras in terms of the social function they have in ritual contexts (and beyond).

  2. Thank you very much for your reply! In my opinion, the characteristics “speech act” and “superlinguistic text” are independent of each other. There are regular speech acts (like p in your example) and speech acts to which a special power is attributed, e.g. curses: depending on the context and culture, it is actually believed that the statement “I curse you with hair loss!” leads to hair loss.

    However, there are also forms of speech that are not so easy to characterize as speech acts, for example utterances whose sender and receiver are the same person (e.g. thinking and self-talk). If I repeat the sentence “I am self-aware” to myself every day, I might one day start to believe it. But that’s just accepting the assertion. If I also believe that repeating the phrase to myself actually makes me more self-aware, then I consider the text superlinguistic – most people will agree that language can’t change the state of something by itself. The same applies when I silently bless the tea in my cup with a Sanskrit mantra – the intention of this utterance does not need to be inferred in this case; nor does it necessarily need a convention for it to be understood and work.

    Does this make sense?

  3. Hi Dominik,

    thanks for the post!

    I wonder whether a useful approach would be to use an emic approach and look at how Sanskrit thinkers defined mantras. As you surely can anticipate, there are important differences and Śaiva scholars like Abhinavagupta will offer very different definitions than Mīmāṃsā ones, but this does not need to be a flaw, since Mīmāṃsā authors would not recognise some Tantric formulations as mantras (and possibly vice versa). I also wonder whether the idea of family resemblances (instead of a semantic kernel) could help.
    Last, on whether mantras have a meaning in Nirukta and Mīmāṃsā (hint: their meaning is there, but it is not vivakṣita), please see Taber 1989.

    • Hi Elisa, thank you! Yes, emic approaches are very interesting indeed, but as you’re saying, Sanskrit thinkers are generally not interested in expanding their definition of mantra to include mantras from different traditions. For this, one needs a different approach – the idea of family resemblances that you mentioned is certainly very promising!

  4. A more emic approach is taken in Moore Gerety’s PhD (Harvard 2015, download from dash.harvard.edu) This Whole World is OM, tracing the theme from the Vedas through to the yoga Upanishads. Along the way he finds the Gāyatrī-Mantra characterized as unexpressed, as though directed inwards.

    Om is found to be a regular focus of interest in the way of soteriology, and in the Jaiminīya tradition undergoes a spectacular development through identification with Prajāpati, as a cosmogonic principle, an unbounded potential, and in that way least of all defined! Comparable is the latent or implicit Prakṛīti in the Yoga-sūtra at 1.19, glossed as the gods in the Yogaśāstra Bhāshya.

    A philosophical turn is marked at the last in the Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad, where Om is divided or distributed into quarters, the three phonemes plus ātman as a transcendent fourth. To me, this turn leads on to the subtle body of speech in the Classical discourse, along the way drawing the attention of Patañjali the grammarian. An account of this kind draws the emic testimony into a familiar etic narrative form.

    The question now posed by Domonik and Elisa is whether that is adequate to the subtle body of the texts. There one can scarcely afford to ignore praṇa emerging from the Vedic tradition and as a vital principle informing the Ayurvedic medicine, from which in turn emerge the nadis of later speculation. But a method ot hermeneutic suitable to such passes is not to hand.

  5. Hi Dominik!

    If you are still there, I have a question about your superlinguistic principle. You seem to me to analyze it in a dismissive manner characteristic of the old Orientalism, essentially as superstition, a charge Protestants also throw at Catholics.
    You mention the discourse on natural language, but not the way it drew on qualities of sound to present words as icons or images of natural meanings. Such accounts are now dismissed in linguistics, but rhetoric still makes space for all the emotional resonances of sounds, and that leaves amply room for understanding mantras as rhetorical pleas or appeals.

    My question is simply whether you have at all considered praṇa as a superlinguistic principle? It emerges from the Vedas with a metaphor of coitus or copulation (mentioned by Gerety 2015, see above) which also informed alchemy as received in the West, as in the old spagyric art (of dyes and dyeing) noted by Paracelsus – and echoes through to the modern chemical valence. Back in India, that was enough to get Ayurveda going as an Upaveda, application of the Vedas.

    More familiar in philosophy is the debate about causality raised by Sāṃkhya, which reached to ethical controversy about violence in sacrifice, as Elisa once noted. In that pass the guṇas of Sāṃkhya were also serving as an superlinguistic principle.

    I know this is way of the beaten tracks of academia, but Paracelsus is now being rediscovered in his native Switzerland also as a theologian. And here at last makes clear why I am never understood, also in earlier debates about Ken Wilbur. But I can now thank you, Dominik and Elisa, for raising these difficulties as it prompted me to find in OM a manner of yoga, for toning smooth muscles of the throaght.

    That in a way is what I was searching for all these years, with related insights into the subtle body (functional symmetries mediating voluntary and involuntary movements). But I am still interested to trace the four causal factors through the Yogaśāstra into early Buddhist metaphysics, where the superlinguistic theme reaches to Amod’s interests.

    • Hi Orwin,

      thank you for your interest! No, my introducing the idea of the superlinguistic principle was not meant to be dismissive. There is more to language than just communication; as you point out, it also has physiological and phonological aspects. Humans use the vocal apparatus for other purposes than the transmission of information – to clear their throat, for example – and even in ways that (seemingly) serve no purpose at all, for example when just playing with sounds or to sooth or stimulate themselves. Breath control (prāṇāyāma) can also be connected to that.

      Many would even regard all (or almost all) products of the vocal apparatus as manifestations of language, especially if they involve the use of regular phonemes. This includes vocal music. As Gerety showed, OM emerged from music, and there are many sung variations of it in the Sāmavedic tradition. The original OMs were characterized by features that are not a part of everyday speech: the use of the singing voice, prolonged articulation, and repetition. Then, OM became a (more) regular word, and the question arose as to what exactly it means.

      I would say that the physiological or musical potencies associated with certain texts and textual practices are phenomena in themselves. It is one thing to think that it is just the sounds of a formula that make it effective and another thing to think that it becomes effective in some way that cannot be perceived directly.

      This is not to say that emotions and beliefs are irrelevant – on the contrary, I would argue that in many cases they are directly responsible for the perception that a text is indeed effective. It’s just much more difficult to verify this.

  6. Thank you very much, Dominic, for a lucid and concise summary of what Gerety offers, which I was not able to give. In the process you give a new and now relevant meaning to the term phenomena, one which carries the full philosophical weight of existential phenomenology, a very promissing development in recent philosophy sadly obscured by the delirious ranting of Martin Heidegger, which was just catering in the forgiving way of theology to the polarization of perceptions so evident today.

    For a way ahead now, the musical or physiological potencies you describe come on record in the Āśvalāyana Śrauta Sūtra, where as Gerety puts it (@83&*32) there appear “… special accent patterns, which are described but not reproduced in the unaccented sūtra text (see ĀśvŚS 7.11.3-5, 12); thus the transformations are not only morphological but musical.” And for just this new challenge to scholars, the commentator Gārgya Nārāyaṇa provided an explanation; this was evidently the grammarian later cited by Yaksa in his Nirukta, and by Pāṇini among his predecessors.

    So the stage was set for the later part of the sūtra, featuring a trirātra [three nights] liturgy (ĀśvŚS 10.2) due to the Vedic figure Garga Bhāradvāja, whose hymns and dānastuti to his chieftain mark the historical layering of the Ṛg-veda at Book 6.47, where the old family lineages give way to new lines marked by kevala adoptions, evidencing considerable assimilation of new population… as from the collapsing Indus Valley cities! With the night as the characteristic ritual setting for the metaphorical ‘çopulations’of ṛc and sāman in the later Vedic liturgies, you have marked up here the whole historical phenomenon, with the physiology spilling through praṇa discourse into Ayurveda, a process richly documented in the Anugita of the Mahābhārata (SBE VIII).

    Thennilapuram P. Mahadevan On the Southern Recension of the Mahābhārata, Brahman Migrations, and Brāhmī Paleography, notes contemporary brahmins declaring their allegiances by gotra and by sūtra, as by lineage and education, showing the sūtras still shaping professional identites. And on that note we come naturally enough to your philosophical conclusion, finding perception shaping or constructing meaning in language. I have found this question probed to real philosophical depth in the Yogaśāstra, just where the commentary turns around citations from Pañcaśikha, the ancient teacher of yoga and Sāṁkhya. At YS 1.36 his aphorism has proved nearly untranslatable, turning on iti to evoke text from within:

    Tam-aṇu-mātram-ātmānam-anu-vidya-asmi-iti-evaṃ tātvat saṃ-pra-jānīte ||

    Hall, who followed Garbe in collecting the fragments of Pañcaśikha, gave: “The inscrutable self knowing at last it is that, in this form ascertains for certain.” But Woods, for Harvard, then defaulted to the modern idealism of Descartes and Kant! “Pondering upon this self which is a mere atom, one is conscious in the same way as when one is conscious to the extent that one says ‘I am’.”

    Having earlier despaired of it, I now find my way to a clunky literalism of: “Learning by the ongoing (aṇu) measure of the self’s observance (anu) being just adaptability in this said (iti!) self-regard (asmitā?!).” So we continually assimilate experiences to our habitual strategies of coping, often at the expense of learning humbly from mistakes – but I’m probably still doing the same here with tātvat, which I have not found anywhere. . . Any further insight here would be most welcome.

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