Snakes wrongly grasped: on the psychedelic experiences of Musk and Manson

If Nāgārjuna, the great Madhyamaka Buddhist philosopher, is known for anything, it’s his doctrine of the emptiness (śūnyatā) of all things. But in his most famous work, Nāgārjuna warns his audience about emptiness: “Misperceived emptiness ruins a person of dull intelligence, like a snake wrongly grasped.” (MMK XXIV.11) If you know how to pick up a poisonous snake properly, you can move it to a place where it will do less harm, or even milk it to help produce an antidote. But if you don’t, then trying to grasp it will get you bitten and maybe killed. Likewise, if you perceive emptiness wrongly, that’s worse than not perceiving it at all.

If you’re going to try this, you’d better know what you’re doing. Adobe Stock image copyright by kampwit.

Nāgārjuna had good reason to be worried. As Ethan Mills noted years ago, the later Indian thinker Jayarāśi adopted a skepticism much like Nāgārjuna’s but without any Buddhist commitment, dropping our philosophical commitments and leaving us back in pre-theoretical everyday life (“the worldly path should be followed”). From Nāgārjuna’s perspective, that’s a disaster: it’ll leave you even more trapped in suffering than before. In that regard I think it’s significant that Śāntideva and Candrakīrti, Nāgārjuna’s later followers in the Madhyamaka school, both wrote texts that combined metaphysics and ethics – and put the metaphysics after the ethics. First you learn to follow the ethical path, controlling your cravings and attachments, and only then do you start reflecting in detail on how all things are empty.

Lately I’ve been thinking about Nāgārjuna’s point quite a bit in a psychedelic context. I think that a core commonality between many psychedelic and classical mystical experiences is an experience of self-transcendence, one that feels something like a “transformation from self-centredness to Reality-centredness” (in the words of John Hick, a philosopher of religion) – where one forgets oneself and merges with some sort of larger reality (God, dao 道, emptiness). Something seems like it should be ethically positive about this – shouldn’t such a vision make us less “selfish”? Indeed, in Hick’s view, the transformation from self-centredness to Reality-centredness is a fundamentally ethical one: to be far enough along it is to be a saint, one who has had “a transcendence of the ego point of view and its replacement by devotion to or centred concentration upon some manifestation of the Real, response to which produces compassion/love towards other human beings or towards all life.” (Interpretation of Religion 301) But I think we need to be very careful about that sort of claim.

The point came up in my interview with Osheen Dayal of MAPS Canada, where I pointed to the example of tycoon Elon Musk. It is publicly documented that Musk has used psilocybin, LSD and more, and given his known involvement in psychedelic spaces like Burning Man, he’s probably done far more than the documents let on. He has almost certainly had multiple psychedelic experiences of self-transcendence in the face of a larger reality. And yet Musk is about as far as one could imagine from “compassion/love towards other human beings or towards all life.” Rather, he is practically a caricature of a self-absorbed egoist, so confident in his own rightness that he used his brief time in government to destroy thousands of military veterans’ lifelong careers and end the lifelines of thousands of desperately poor people around the world in the name of saving a tiny fraction of money and sometimes nothing at all. Musk is to today’s generations what Charles Manson was to the baby boomers: a sobering reminder that psychedelic experiences can leave you a terrible person.

And that brings us back to the snake wrongly grasped. One commonly reported reaction to Griffiths’s Johns Hopkins psilocybin experiments was a sense of certainty: an utter lack of doubt that what one encountered or became in one’s experience was real. But certainty is dangerous: indeed, it can itself be a narcissistic expression of one’s own hubris, as Musk and Manson exemplify. I have tended to think that certainty is something we are better off without. While I have had some powerful psychedelic experiences, I’ve never had the sort that’s accompanied by a feeling of certainty; if I ever do, I want to make sure that I keep my old concerns about certainty at the front of my mind. Because to me the psychedelic experiences of Musk and Manson confirm Nāgārjuna’s warning: they very likely have seen their self dissolve and merge with emptiness… and they grasped that snake entirely wrongly.

All that said, I don’t want to say that there’s no connection between mystical experiences of self-transcendence and a more ethical or selfless way of life. I have found my own experiences open me up more to the joy of serving others. Classical mystical texts do tend to indicate that there is something ethically worthy about the one who has had these states (like in Zhuangzi’s passage where the one who sits and forgets has surpassed Confucius). Here, I think, we can turn to the other side of the metaphor: if you grasp a snake rightly, you can collect valuable medicine from it. That’s why Śāntideva and Candrakīrti tell you to work on your ethical conduct before you strive to perceive the emptiness of all things.

6 Replies to “Snakes wrongly grasped: on the psychedelic experiences of Musk and Manson”

  1. Nāgārjuna’s snake analogy seemed to be a warning chiefly against using solely an intellectual approach to “understand” emptiness (which may lead to hedonism or nihilism and, ultimately, to more suffering). By contrast, besides an inability/unwillingness to deal with an apparent history of trauma, Musk appears to be suffering from cognitive impairments (and other maladies) due to ketamine (over)use. That’s not to discount a possible role of psychedelics in Musk’s illusions of grandeur (and Messiah complex), but my bet would be on uncontrolled psychotropic use and a raft of unresolved psychological issues.

    • Many would count ketamine as a psychedelic, but the claims here don’t depend on that. The point is that his use of psychedelics of many kinds doesn’t seem to have taught him anything.

  2. 1. I think that the warning refers to a possible incorrect understanding of emptiness, not as a mere character of everything but as a thing -that is, a substantialist understanding of emptiness. That is why, in other context, we not only find the explanation of emptiness of things and emptiness of persons, but of emptiness of emptiness as well: shunyata, like everything, is shunya, asvabhavika.
    In Phenomenology of mysticism we find that mystical experience does not only create a moral improvement. That only happens in mystical experiences that happen in the context of (traditional or individual) world views that value positively ethical virtues like love, compassion, etc.

    • I agree with your last sentence, yes; that’s kind of the point I was trying to make. Mystical experience isn’t enough without an ethical grounding. While Nāgārjuna’s warning isn’t specifically about mystical experience, I think it absolutely applies, given that emptiness or something very close to it is central to so many mystical experiences one might have.

  3. In the way of comparisons, we are touching here on a deep, hidden problem in interpreting Aristotle’s Ethics. It’s a large, rambling text, which shows awkward signs of revision. It’s also where Aristotle explicitly engages the work of Eudoxus, who is famous as a mathematician and astronomer, but not well known in philosophy. What Aristotle finds in Eudoxus us a way of reasoning in ethics through proportion, which brings him to his well-known Middle Way or Golden Mean positíon; but the mathematical or quantitative side of the argument remains very little examined.
    There was an ancient Law of Comparison, drawn from observations of water-birds and fish, giving a relation between speed and hydraulic depth or displacement. Remarkably, this law carried to modern ship design and hydrodynamics, through the work of William Froude and others before him, in the nineteenth century. Whether in traditional or modern form, it finds design in nature and art governed by *what’s not there* because it’s displaced elsewhere. And in ethics that twist or irony carries the argument to *what is not done* as in avoiding the extremes for the middle ground. But don’t look in the philosophy texts or lecture courses for any of this.

  4. Pingback: Noted without comment – Yet Another Unitarian Universalist

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