Sanskrit philosophy is extremely sophisticated and I am convinced that we don’t need to borrow categories from Euro-American philosophy to better understand it.
Parallels to Euro-American theories are welcome because they can help us focus on overlooked aspects, but they are not more important than parallels that go in the opposite directions, namely looking at Euro-American philosophy from the lens of Sanskrit philosophy.
In other words, it is good to ask, for instance, whether Mīmāṃsā epistemology is a form of internalism or of externalism, but one should
- a) never forget that the binary opposition between internalism and externalism is not a fact about the world, but rather a philosophical choice and that the epistemological landscape could be described otherwise;
- b) be also ready to wonder whether, e.g., Timothy Williamson embraces intrinsic validity (svataḥ prāmāṇya).
Point a) enables one to see that a the conceptual space is not constrained by any given binary etc. and that one of the main contributions of Global philosophy is to question one’s frame of reference for the questions one asks, not just for the answers one receives. Point b) helps one in highlighting possibly overlooked aspects within, e.g., T.Williamson’s theory.
In summary, I am convinced that we should not* force Sanskrit theories into the straitjacket of extant Euro-American terminology. By doing so, we would be missing the main benefits of starting a broad conversation.
*Thanks to Amod for noticing the typo!
I think you meant we should *not* force Sanskrit theories into the straitjacket of extant Euro-American terminology?
right, my comment as well
Yes, of course! Thanks!
Generally agreed. We speakers of European languages learn less when we only try to understand classical or medieval Indians’ answers to our questions. We do better when we start asking ourselves their questions. There is a limit to this – I don’t think it makes a lot of sense for us to ask ourselves “why is the Veda always authoritative?” – but there are many other levels at which Indian traditions provoke us to think in new ways.
Thanks, Amod. To be honest, I do thinks that there is value even in exploring topics that we are unlikely to agree with. It’s thought-provoking to wonder why rational people argued rationally about, e.g., the reality of Brahmana-hood, or about whether widows should self-immolate on the pyre of their deceased husbands. At the very least, one can appreciate the rational argumentation. (NB: I don’t think that it would be interesting to read mythological etc. arguments about the same topics).
Similar issues arise in Chinese philosophy. In many cases, it is easier for scholars to position themselves as gatekeepers within a subfield than to undertake the long, demanding work of developing genuine linguistic competence. As a result, we see a proliferation of publications on topics such as “knowing-how,” and the subfield becomes shaped by a small number of influential figures. More concerning, however, is the presence of many area-studies generalists who lack not only the necessary linguistic skills but also adequate philosophical training.
Hi Yang and thanks for your comment. Do you mean that some scholars (I assume that these are primarily philosophers formed in the Euro-American canon) work as gatekeepers even though they don’t know Chinese? And that some, conversely, lack both philosophical training and linguistic skills?
As philosophers, we are interested in particular problems, make the corresponding philosophical questions and look for previous answers in the three philosophical traditions (if we know them). There we find new concepts, ideas and arguments. There are some philosophical terms in Sanskrit, Chinese, etc. that can be more or less translated into Western philosophical concepts; but there are others that cannot. In this case, we’ll have to use the original terms, after understanding their scope the best we can, or use a conventional translation noting clearly its conventional character. Sometimes the answers we find modify our initial questioning, in an indefinite process of question – study of previous answers – critical reflection – provisional conclusion – new question… Indian and Chinese concepts, theories and arguments have influenced essentially my own philosophy, as I suppose is the case with all of us?
I agree with all, Javier, but with the fact that there are *three* philosophical traditions. I don’t think that there is anything monolithic that remains constant throughout the centuries in China, nor in the Sanskrit world nor in Europe and the Americas.
Agreed. More precisely: there are three philosophical traditions which started in Greece, India and China. They have expanded to other regions and cultures and are gradually, in different moments, ways and intensities, influencing each other, pointing to a real global philosophy (that we are trying to practice and help to spread among “non-believers”).
On point (a): a lot of „binaries“ such as internalism-externalism are not mere exports from Euro-American philosophy to philosophy but also have become arguably universalisable questions because of their success (I don’t mean mere empirical success but even conceptual fecundity, etc) in the sciences. And then the sciences’ use of these concepts in hypotheses or sometimes even successful theories feeds back into philosophy, changing debates within philosophy itself. So the question may or may not be valid from a traditional epistemological standpoint and yet be perfectly valid from the stanpoint of philosophy of science (which itself still remains largely Eurocentric though there are signs for optimism outside the mind sciences-Buddhist studies philosophical corners also). For instance, there might be historical debates on causation that need not be read in terms of current best science but there are important scientific debates adapting to which should not necessarily be seen as some kind of loss. (I read Ganeri’s paper on British and Cārvāka emergentism too long ago so can’t remember if my point applies to it or not; but if it does, then that’s the sort of thing I have in mind for not assuming that adapting to the current landscape is always a loss.)
Thank you for your thoughts, Vipul. Are you suggesting that since “causality” has been adopted by the natural sciences we should not investigate it further? And don’t you think that the sciences are not at all a “neutral” point of view and often just use words (such as “evidence”) without explaining them well enough?
@Elisa, this is an intriguing argument – could you say whether I understand its implications correctly? a) You state that Euro-American concepts aren’t necessary to explain non-Western ideas, but then you use, for example, the Western “category” of “epistemology” to formulate your idea – does that mean that notions such as these have become unproblematic and global (=non-Euro-American), and that they can be used independently of their conceptual history? b) Can writing in academic English on texts composed, for example, by Indian monks in ancient times, fully and adequately reflect the meaning of those texts, making engagements with the problems of translation (e.g. indeterminacy in Quine’s sense) superfluous? For example, in translating hetutva, would we simply say that this is “causation,” and that further comparative investigations are unnecessary? c) Do you think that writing in academic English (which, to some people’s sense, bears the mark of scholastic and early modern philosophical language) offers a neutral space/platform to discuss any philosophy? For example, if somebody were to write an English book on “Mīmāṃsā epistemology” today, would that book fully and exhaustively reproduce Mīmāṃsā philosophy and not raise translation problems that could only be resolved through comparativism? – All three questions in one: Did I understand your point correctly, that Sanskrit philosophy can fully express itself through other languages, even if the words of those languages have their roots in a different conceptual history?
Thank you for raising these points, Fabien, and for forcing me to specify my perspective.
a) Yes, “epistemology” as a meta-category seems to me adequate enough to represent the topic of pramāṇa-studies. I would just explain that Euro-American epistemology tends to focus on the definition of knowledge (e.g., as JTB) whereas Sanskrit epistemology tends to focus on the ways to acquire it. I think that this can be explained and the term can then be used safely. But I would not say the same in case of, e.g., the definition of knowledge as JTB (I know of articles that agonize over finding the Sanskrit equivalent of “belief” instead of just accepting that the landscape is different).
b) Yes, I believe in translation, especially in its in-fieri status (one has never finished translating but translating is part of one’s journey towards the text but also towards understanding one’s own baggage (your example of “causality” shows it clearly, given that most of us presuppose an Aristotelian paradigm, often without even being aware of it).
c) Not just English. I think that languages are omni-potent, in the sense that they are apt to represent each other’s conceptual worlds. In some cases, one will need a full sentence or paragraph instead of a single word, but this is not the problem. But one needs to be self-aware and self-surveilling insofar as not letting one’s un-reflected biases slip in one’s translations (this is always an ongoing process).
What are your thoughts?
Thanks, Elisa, that’s a great answer. It would make an interesting article.
I agree with both your call to refrain from asking Sanskrit philosophers to justify themselves through European or American language and your invitation to reflect on Western systems critically through Sanskrit philosophy.
However, as someone who mostly works on cross-cultural dialogue, I’d try to save the following aspects from your critique:
a) Students often find their way to non-Western traditions through the lens of what they already know. Departments interested in attracting non-Western specialists also react positively to attempts to build bridges between traditions. So, while it’s not a need, there’s a pedagogical usefulness in comparing philosophies.
b) Ancient Greek and Sanskrit philosophies are so uniquely similar that it appears natural to explore how those similarities emerged. There a real historical value in etymological research, for example.
c) In quantitative terms, the vast majority of scholarship on Sanskrit philosophy still relies on Western categories and comparisons. For example, William Waldron’s recent Yogācāra book relies extensively on cognitive science. While I agree with you that it’s not necessary to use one language to reconstruct another language, I’d say that it will remain like this for quite some time.
d) There is a need to deconstruct past appropriations of Sanskrit philosophies in the West, and such historical work still requires engagements with both sides. It is perhaps not the most interesting task for Sanskritists, but it is part of the decolonization of philosophy. There is no “need” (to use your word) for Western categories, but there is a need to respond to people who have misused categories. For example, it would be useful to respond to Waldron’s anti-idealist cog-sci reading of Yogācāra, and such a response would have to at least mention cross-cultural issues.
Thanks, Fabien. I agree with your points a-d. But I also think that sooner or later we may
1) want to stop considering Euro-American philosophy as the only entry point to “philosophy”. Why not starting with Sanskrit philosophy instead? I can see clear advantages in having a cohort of PhD students who don’t share the same biases. This became particularly evident for me in Canada, since many of my students have no background in the history of Euro-American philosophy.
2) Similarly, I see your point about deconstructing wrong parallels, but some of them are just so Eurocentric and fundamentally misplaced that I don’t see any fundamental benefit in discussing them in detail (say “Sanskrit rational theology is inferior because there is no Lord who creates e nihilo”).
3) You are surely right about specific similarities, we learn through comparison (so, better make them explicit) and the ones with Greece are often striking!
Sorry but I didn’t mean to assume taking the sciences at their face value, which is why it is the standpoint from philosophy of science (and more specifically, empirically engaged philosophy of science), not science, that matters.
Thanks for clarifying, Vipul!
The point you make is appreciated. We also need to turn our attention to the presuppositions that are widely shared within each of the traditions. These presuppositions may not be thematised in these traditions, precisely because they are so widely shared. Then putting these presuppositions in dialogue with each other. This seems pregnant with philosophical possibilities.
A well-known example could be the different conceptualisations of knowledge in the two traditions in terms of knowledge episodes in one, and in terms of propositions in the other. In your words ‘just accepting that the landscape is different’. These have far-ranging consequences in shaping each tradition. But are these two separate universes of discourse destined to remain separate? Do we have to choose one over the other? In stead shouldn’t we launch new enquiries: What are the reasons for each what is their unique power and unique insight?
The question of the difference between jñāna and ‘knowledge’ is not merely a question of appropriate translation between languages, though translation does pose challenges. But ordinary language is fertile and can deal with new concepts even if they derive from other cultures.
Good points, Avinash. We don’t need to choose one point of view over the other, but we also can’t imagine ourselves as thinking in a “no-place”, unbiased and untouched by our departure points. Instead, we need to constantly scrutinise our beliefs and gradually unlearn our biases, by exposing them to the flame of reasoning, especially other reasonings! (All imho)
Pingback: A word of caution on philosophical methodology | elisa freschi