Is I-cognition for Kumārila a kind of perception?

My previous post looked at Elisa’s discussion of a seeming contradiction in Kumārila.

In this post I attempt to give my own answer to the question that Elisa saw as prompted by that seeming contradiction: Does Kumārila accept that the self can be perceived?  Since Kumārila argues that the self is cognized by I-cognition (ahampratyaya), the question can also be worded as: Is I-cognition a kind of perception?

I think it is beyond doubt that for Kumārila the self is known through perception – I-cognition being a kind of perception (more specifically, a kind of perception whose primary faculty is the manas: mānasapratyakṣa).  It is true that Kumārila does not use the word pratyakṣa in the main I-cognition section of the Ślokavārttika (ātmavāda 107–139).  But that Kumārila is putting I-cognition forward in those verses as a kind of perception is, I think, the only natural way to interpret him.  I will separate out three kinds of evidence: that available in the Ślokavārttika itself, that in the Mīmāṃsaka commentators on the Ślokavārttika, and that in non-Mīmāṃsakas who discuss I-cognition, frequently by focussing on these verses by Kumārila.

1. These verses begin (v. 107) with the announcement that after the refutation of the Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika inferences of the self in the previous verses (92cd–106), it will now be shown that the self knows itself through I-cognition.  The contrast between inference and I-cognition is clear: I-cognition is introduced as a non-inferential means of knowing the self.  The point is: perception can succeed in giving knowledge of the self where inference failed.

Neither of the two commentators on this part of the Ślokavārttika, Sucarita and Pārthasārathi, interpret the verse in any way other than this.[1]  What other possible way is there of interpreting it?  If I-cognition is neither inference nor perception what else could it be?  Śabda, arthāpatti, upamāna or abhāva.  But none of those four are viable options.  Could it be a non-pramāṇa?  How is that compatible with it being Kumārila’s preferred way of establishing the existence of the self?

2. The ātmavāda chapter’s advancing of I-cognition as the means by which we know the self is a commentary on the Vṛttikāra’s claims in the Śābarabhāṣya that the self perceives itself (pp. 56,7 ff. in Frauwallner’s edition).

See, e.g.:
svasaṃvedyaḥ sa bhavati (56,24)
asau puruṣaḥ svayam ātmānam upalabhate (58,3)
anyaḥ puruṣaḥ svayam ātmānam upalabhate (58,5)  
tena sarve svena svenātmanā ātmānam upalabhamānāḥ santy eva (58,5–6)
svayaṃjyotiṣṭvavacanāt (58,11) – clear from context that it’s the puruṣa that has the svayaṃjyotiṣṭva
bhavān svayam ātmānaṃ paśyati (58,25)
aham api tādṛśam eva paśyāmi (60,1) – svayam ātmānaṃ to be supplied from context

The Vṛttikāra supports these contentions with Upaniṣadic citations:
– “śāntāyāṃ vāci kiṃjyotir evāyaṃ puruṣaḥ? ātmajyotiḥ, samrāḍ iti hovāca”
– “atrāyaṃ puruṣaḥ svayaṃjyotir bhavati”

So there’s no way to doubt that the source text Kumārila is expounding in this part of the Ślokavārttika unambiguously asserts that the self perceives itself.  Kumārila explains these assertions by means of the concept of I-cognition, arguing at length that the only possible object of I-cognition is the self.  So it seems impossible to interpret Kumārila as advancing I-cognition as non-perceptual without finding him guilty of massive misrepresentation of his source text.

3. Kumārila attributes to himself the view that the self perceives itself when he refers to these ātmavāda verses in the śūnyavāda chapter.  

Ślokavārttika śūnyavāda 67cd:
nanv ātmā grāhako grāhyo bhavatābhyupagamyate ||
[Vijñānavādin:] “But you [Kumārila] hold that the self is both perceiver and perceived.”[2]

4. Kumārila is aware of the seeming contradiction between his holding the self to perceive itself and his denying that cognition can perceive itself. He draws attention to this seeming contradiction in śūnyavāda 67cd, and addresses it (śūnyavāda 68 ff.).  If he had not held the self to be perceived, there would not have been any seeming contradiction, so he would not have drawn attention to it and addressed it.

5. All the talk of recognition of the self in ātmavāda 109–136 assumes that the self is perceived.  The recognition involves taking the thing one is perceiving now to be the thing one perceived earlier.  Without the present perception of the self and the memory of the earlier perception of the self, we wouldn’t be dealing with recognition.

6. Many of Kumārila’s arguments in ātmavāda 109–136 for why the object of I-cognition / I-recognition cannot be anything other than the self involve the assumption that whatever the object is, it must be perceptible / must be being perceived at the time of the I-cognition.  E.g. the Buddhist move of saying that the object of the I-cognition is momentary cognitions is ruled out by Kumārila on the grounds that the earlier cognition does not exist now so cannot be being perceived now, and the present cognition did not exist earlier so could not have been perceived then (ātmavāda 117–120).

7. Even if verses 107–139 of the ātmavāda chapter left any doubt about I-cognition being advanced as pratyakṣa, there is the evidence of later verses in that chapter:

142b–d: ātmā kena prakāśyate
ātmanaiva prakāśyo ’yam ātmājyotir itīritam ||

143: agrāhya iti sāmānyāt sarveṇeti pratīyate
ātmajyotiṣṭvavacanāt parair ity avatiṣṭhate ||

145ab: ātmajñānāvinābhūtadṛṣṭaceṣṭānirūpaṇāt[3]

***

So much for the evidence from the Ślokavārttika.  How about evidence from later Mīmāṃsakas?  No later Mīmāṃsaka interprets Kumārila as putting forward I-cognition as anything other than pratyakṣa.

8. Both Sucarita and Pārthasārathi take him to be asserting the perceptibility of the self.  See e.g. Kāśikā ad ātmavāda 107: pratyakṣabalasiddho ’yam, na tu laiṅgika it bhāvaḥ.

9. See Śālikanātha’s characterization of the Bhāṭṭa view at Prakaraṇapañcikā, p. 333, 1–3:
tatra ke cid āhuḥ—mānasaṃ pratyakṣaṃ sukhādiṣv ivātmani pramāṇam iti. tad ayuktam iti prābhākarāḥ. na hy ekasya kartṛtvam karmatvaṃ ca svāpekṣam upapadyate, svātmani kriyāvṛttivirodhāt.
“In response to that [question], some [i.e. the Bhāṭṭas and some Naiyāyikas] maintain that the means of knowing the self is mental perception, as it is [the means of knowing] pleasure and such like. The Prābhākaras hold that that is incorrect. For it is not possible that one thing can be both agent and object with regard to itself, for it is contradictory [to suppose that] an instance of activity [could act] towards itself.”

***

How about the evidence of non-Mīmāṃsakas who discuss these ātmavāda verses or who discuss I-cognition?

10. Jayanta takes Kumārila’s ātmavāda verses (107–136) to be describing a kind of pratyakṣa. 

The first sentence of Jayanta’s summary of these verses reads:
“In this matter [of how we know the self], the Mīmāṃsakas claim that the self is perceptible, because it can be grasped by I-cognition”:
tatra pratyakṣam ātmānam aupavarṣāḥ prapedire, ahampratyayagamyatvāt.

And he finishes his summary with:
“Therefore the self is perceptible because it is grasped by I-cognition”:
tasmād ahaṃpratyayagamyatvād ātmā pratyakṣa iti.

Both these sentences show the natural connection between being grasped by ahampratyaya and being perceived.

Jayanta has a reputation for being an accurate interpreter of Kumārila, often getting him right when his commentators get him wrong.  In this case there is no conflict with the commentators anyway, as we saw above.

Other opponents of the perceptibility of the self such as Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla present I-cognition as a kind of perception.  

11. Śāntarakṣita, Tattvasaṅgraha 212
anyaiḥ pratyakṣasiddhatvam ātmanaḥ parikalpitam |
svasaṃvedyo hy ahaṅkāras tasyātmā viṣayo mataḥ ||

Śāntarakṣita, Tattvasaṅgraha 215ab 
yadi pratyakṣagamyaś ca satyataḥ puruṣo bhavet |

12. Kamalaśīla ad 212
te hy evam āhuḥ – pratyakṣata evātmā siddhaḥ

And if we turn to non-Mīmāṃsakas who advanced I-cognition as a valid means of knowing the self – Naiyāyikas from Uddyotakara onwards, Rāmakaṇṭha and other Śaivas – we find it always featuring as a kind of mānasapratyakṣa.

13. Uddyotakara ad Nyāyasūtra 3.1.1:

nāsty ātmā, anupalabdher iti cet, atrāpi pratijñādoṣaḥ, dṛṣṭāntadoṣaś ca pūrvavat.  yad apy anupalabdher iti, tad apy ayuktam. sāpy anupalabdhir asiddhā, pratyakṣādipramāṇaviṣayatvād ātmanaḥ. pratyakṣena tāvad ātmopalabhyate. katham pratyakṣeṇa? liṅgaliṅgisambandhasmṛtyanapekṣaṃ viṣayasvabhāvabhedānuvidhāyy aham iti vijñānaṃ rūpādijñānavat pratyakṣam. yac cāpi bhavān muktasaṃśayaṃ pratyakṣaṃ pratipadyate, tasya kutaḥ pratyakṣatvam iti? avaśyaṃ bhavatā jñānam eva liṅgādisambandhanirapekṣaṃ svātmasaṃvedyaṃ pratipattavyam.

“If you say there is no Self because it is not perceived, in that case too there is a fault in the assertion and in the example, as before. And as for [the logical reason], “because [it] cannot be perceived,” that is also incorrect. [For] this non-perception too is unproved because the Self is the object of direct perception and the [other] means of knowledge. The Self is perceived, first of all, by perception. How come by perception? Cognition of the form “I” is direct perception, just like a cognition of a colour or such like, not depending on memory of the relation between a mark and that which has that mark, and conforming to the different own-natures of its objects. And why is that which you hold without doubt to be direct perception, direct perception? Necessarily you must maintain [that it is direct perception because it is] just cognition that does not depend on [memory of] the relation between a mark and [that which has that mark], and that is experienced by one’s own self [all of which apply equally to I-cognition].”

14.  For an edition and translation of Rāmakaṇṭha’s extended defence of I-cognition as a means of perceiving the self (in the Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa), accompanied by my commentary, and annotation pointing to parallel discussions, see Watson (2006: The Self’s Awareness of Itself. Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha’s Arguments Against the Buddhist Doctrine of No-Self, pp. 257–332).

15. It became common for doxographers to ascribe to Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas the view that the self is perceived by mānasapratyakṣa in that it is grasped by I-cognition:
ahaṃpratyayagamyo hy ātmeti mānasapratyakṣa ātmā jaiminīyānām (see Watson 2006: 248).

What relevance do these later passages have for establishing Kumārila’s position?  Well at least we can say that it would be strange if

• Kumārila saw I-cognition as something other than mānasapratyakṣa
• all subsequent authors who discuss I-cognition saw it as mānasapratyakṣa
• yet none of these subsequent authors signal that they are interpreting the concept differently from Kumārila.

***

I sent Elisa this list of passages after her first post, and she thus began her second post by saying that

• scholars after Kumārila “are much more explicit than Kumārila” in identifying I-cognition as perception
• which shows that “they sensed the problem”
• had “the same debates we are having”
• and “addressed the problem” by concluding that I-cognition is mānasapratyakṣa.

I think this goes beyond the evidence, and it will be evident from my two posts that I would not present things in this way.  It’s not clear to me:

• that there is any “problem” in Kumārila’s presentation, or that he even left room for any doubt about whether I-cognition is perception
• that scholars after Kumārila had a debate about whether I-cognition is perception.

A condition of the existence of such a debate is that some people thought I-cognition may not be perception; I have seen no sign of that.  Evidence of post-Kumārila thinkers having this debate would consist of at least one articulation (in either a pūrvapakṣa or siddhānta) suggesting that I-cognition is not, or cannot be, perception.  I have not encountered such an articulation.

I suspect that Kumārila would be somewhat indignant if charged with leaving unsolved in his account of I-cognition a problem concerning whether it is a kind of perception or not – a problem that fell to subsequent authors to solve for him.

***

There are two other reasons (in addition to the “seeming contradiction” that my previous post concerned) for Elisa’s reluctance to see Kumārila as advancing I-cognition as a kind of perception.  This post would be incomplete without my considering them.

1. She expects that if Kumārila had intended it as perceptual, he would have mentioned it in the pratyakṣa chapter of the Ślokavārttika when discussing mānasapratyakṣa.  She lists a number of verses from that chapter where she thinks he could have discussed it, and finds its absence there ‘disappointing’ and ‘disheartening’.[4]

What are we to make of this?  First, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence: just because Kumārila does not mention in those verses that I-cognition is a case of mānasapratyakṣa does not mean that he did not hold it to be a case of mānasapratyakṣa.

If we do conclude from its absence of mention there that he did not hold I-cognition to be perception then we land ourselves with a big problem: We know that Kumārila holds I-cognition to be the means by which we know the self, and we know it is not inferential.  So we land ourselves with the big problem that we then have to conclude either that it is not a pramāṇa at all (in which case how does it enable us to know the self), or that it is one of these: śabda, arthāpatti, upamāna or abhāva.  I’d be surprized if there are any takers for the position that it is one of those four.

So if there are any other plausible explanations of the absence of mention of I-cognition as a kind of perception in the pratyakṣa chapter of Ślokavārttika, other than that Kumārila does not regard it as a kind of perception, then they are to be preferred.  And there are other possible explanations.

A. The pratyakṣa chapter of the Ślokavārttika is a commentary on one section of the Śābarabhāṣya; the ātmavāda chapter is a commentary on a later section of the Śābarabhāṣya.  Perception of the self is not mentioned in the earlier section of the Śābarabhāṣya, but it is in the later one.  Thus Kumārila’s absence of mention of it in the pratyakṣa chapter, but mention of it in the ātmavāda chapter, matches exactly the treatment in his source text.

It is certainly fallacious to infer from the absence of mention of perception of the self in the pratyakṣa section of the Śābarabhāṣya to the conclusion that its author did not accept perception of the self.  The fallacy is demonstrated by the author’s explicit affirmation of perception of the self in the ātmavāda section of the Śābarabhāṣya.  If that inference is clearly fallacious, so too is the parallel inference from absence of mention of perception of the self in the pratyakṣa chapter of the Ślokavārttika.

B. Kumārila’s arguments in the pratyakṣa chapter are not incomplete without mention of I-cognition.  The examples he does give of mānasapratyakṣa – perception of pleasure and pain – do the job perfectly adequately.  No argumentative power would have been added by adducing perception of the self.

C. Indeed his arguments are better illustrated by the less controversial cases of perception of pleasure and pain.  The opponents he is arguing against there are frequently those (such as the Buddhists) who accepted perception of pleasure and pain but did not accept perception of the self.  So citing the latter would have established nothing in the debate against them: it would simply have been met with denial.  The absence of mention may thus be nothing more than Kumārila’s abiding to the principle that an argument is only going to persuade the opponent if its presuppositions are shared by them.

2. She thinks self-perception “seems to contradict the point made in v. 82 [pratyakṣa chapter] against reflectivity”.

That verse denies that a cognition can perceive itself.  The same denial is argued for at length throughout the śūnyavāda chapter of the Ślokavārttika.  Does this contradict self-perception?  Not quite, for that a cognition cannot perceive itself does not entail that the self cannot perceive itself.  One might be able to (as Kumārila does) come up with reasons for cognition being incapable of doing something that the self is capable of.  But I agree with Elisa that there is enough of a tension here for Kumārila to need to do some explaining.  All the more so, in fact, because the reasons Kumārila gives against cognition being able to perceive itself in the śūnyavāda chapter – such as that nothing can be simultaneously perceiver and perceived – seem to tell against the possibility of the self perceiving itself.

My 2020 article (“Four Mīmāṃsā Views Concerning the Self’s Perception of Itself”) is about exactly this – the extent to which we have a genuine contradiction, and how it’s addressed by Kumārila, Umbeka, Sucarita, Pārthasārathi, Prabhākara and Śālikanātha.

The mere existence of the seeming contradiction might prompt one to entertain a negative answer to the question that Elisa uses as the title of her post: “Does Kumārila accept I-cognition as a kind of perception?”  But the fact that the seeming contradiction is acknowledged and addressed by Kumārila and his commentators necessitates a positive answer.  If Kumārila had not held the self to be perceptible, there would have been no seeming contradiction, so nothing for him and his commentators to address.  In case there is any doubt about this, we need only remind ourselves of point 3 above: After Kumārila has argued against his Buddhist opponent that cognition cannot be both perceiver and perceived, he has his Buddhist opponent reply: But you claim the self is both perceiver and perceived (Ślokavārttika śūnyavāda 67cd).  If Kumārila had not held the self to be perceived, he would not have put this charge into the mouth of his opponent.  Or if for some reason he had, he would have responded by denying that he holds the self to be perceptible.  He does not respond like that, but rather he gives a modified model of I-cognition, one that shows how the self can be perceived in spite of the impossibility of cognition being perceived.

It is not only Kumārila, but also his commentators, who acknowledge the contradiction and respond by showing how the self can be perceived despite the impossibility of cognition being perceived.  See, e.g., the Sucarita passage in footnote 5 below, and the passages given in footnotes in “Four Mīmāṃsā Views”.  Indeed as I argue in that article, it is this tension – between accepting that the self can perceive itself, but denying that cognition can – that not only provokes Kumārila’s specific model of I-cognition in śūnyavāda 68 (“View 2”), but also conditions the creation of two other Mīmāṃsaka accounts of self-perception (“View 3” and “View 4”).

So to summarize the difference between my position and the position that Elisa puts forward in the blog post: She thinks there is reason to doubt that Kumārila held the self to be perceptible because of (1) a seeming contradiction with a claim that “perception is sense-perception”, (2) absence of mention of I-cognition in the pratyakṣa chapter of the Ślokavārttika, and (3) a contradiction with the denial of the reflexivity of cognition.  I think there is overwhelming evidence in support of Kumārila’s holding the self to be perceptible (see the 15 points above).  And I think none of these 3 amount to counter-evidence because (1) there is no such seeming contradiction, (2) the absence of mention is better explained in other ways that that Kumārila did not hold the self to be perceptible, and (3) Kumārila himself accepts that there is a seeming contradiction, in his own position, between the the self’s reflexive perception and the impossibility of cognition’s having reflexive perception.  When addressing and attempting to dissolve the contradiction, he even attributes to himself the view that the self has reflexive perception.

Readers may wonder how Kumārila does attempt to dissolve the seeming contradiction.  He distinguishes between the reflexivity of the self and the reflexivity of cognition, such that the former is possible but the latter is impossible (śūnyavāda 68ff. and commentaries thereon).  How does he distinguish them?  His main strategy is to say that, when the self perceives itself, it is not one and the same thing perceiving itself, whereas when cognition perceives itself it is.  That’s because there’s a division in the self between the part doing the perceiving and the part that is being perceived, but there is no corresponding division in cognition.[5]

Against Kumārila’s position, I am tempted to say that in exactly the same way as Kumārila makes a distinction between different aspects of the self, so that one can be the perceiver and one the perceived, the Buddhists distinguish between two aspects of cognition – perceiving and perceived poles (grāhakākāra and grāhyākāra) – so that one can be the perceiver and one the perceived.  Kumārila tries to dissolve the contradiction by saying there’s a division in the self but no division in cognition, but the Buddhist’s purported division in cognition is no more controversial than Kumārila’s purported division in the self.  If that’s the case, we are left with the situation that Kumārila should either deny reflexivity in both cases or accept it in both cases.  But I think it is certain that neither of those was his actual position.

References

Watson (2006)   The Self’s Awareness of Itself. Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha’s Arguments Against the Buddhist Doctrine of No-Self.  Publications of the de Nobili Research Library 32. Vienna: Sammlung de Nobili.

Watson (2020)   ‘Four Mīmāṃsā Views Concerning the Self’s Perception of Itself.’ Journal of Indian Philosophy 48, 5: pp. 889-914. DOI: 10.1007/s10781-020-09446-x.

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[1] See Sucarita’s pratyakṣabalasiddho ’yam, na tu laiṅgika it bhāvaḥ:
“The meaning is that this [self] is established through the power of perception, not through inference.”

[2] Note that grāhaka and grāhya here do not have to mean perceiver and perceived.  In fact, as Suguru Ishimura pointed out to me, when Kumārila uses derivatives from grah in śūnyavāda 66cd–67ab, we can be certain he is using them not of perception but of arthāpatti – for what is being grasped there are a sense-faculty and a cognition.  But in this verse it is most natural to take them as referring to perceiver and perceived: the discussion is about the Buddhist position that cognition is perceiver and perceived, and the parallelism between that and the self being perceiver and perceived. The Vijñānavādin is arguing that if Kumārila asserts the latter he should assert the former.

[3] It is true that in these verses (142–145) we do not actually have the occurrence of the word pratyakṣa: to say that the self is prakāśya or grāhya, or that we have jñāna of it, is not necessarily to say that it is perceived.  But that does seem to be the most natural way to interpret these verses.

[4] “It is in this sense somehow disappointing that Kumārila does not mention the case of ahampratyaya while discussing ātman-manas contact in ŚV pratyakṣa, v. 66.”
“Also disappointing in this regard are ŚV pratyakṣa, vv. 134–139, that discuss the role of manas in svasaṃvitti (refuted by Kumārila) and pleasure etc. (accepted) and never mention the case of “I-cognitions”. Then, again, ŚV pratyakṣa v. 160 states that manas can work on its own, without an external object, but only cites pleasure and pain as an example (yathā hi manasaḥ sārdhaṃ rūpādau cakṣurādinā | pravṛttiḥ sukhaduḥkhādau kevalasyaiva dṛśyate ||). Same with ŚV śabdanityatādhikaraṇa 337 on manas grasping pleasure etc. when not connected with the external senses. This is all not conclusive, but it is disheartening that Kumārila never mentions the case of ahampratyaya in the chapter on perception, if ahampratyaya is in fact a case of perception.”

[5] See Sucaritamiśra’s explanation of śūnyavāda, verse 68: nirbhāgaṃ hi jñānam iti vaḥ siddhāntaḥ.  na caivaṃ­vidhasya dvairūpaym upapannam.  ātmā tu kenacid ātmanā grāhakaḥ, kenacid ātmanā grāhya iti kiṃ nopapadyate.  tathā hi – asyārthasaṃyuktendkriya­saṃyukta­manas­saṃyoginaḥ pratyayo nāma dharmabhedo jāyate.  sa cāsmāt kathañcid dharmarūpeṇa bhinnaḥ.  tena cāyaṃ grāhakaḥ.  yat tasya pṛthivyādidravyāntarasādhāraṇaṃ dravyādirūpaṃ tad grāhyam.  jñānasya tu naivaṃvidhaḥ kaścid vibhāgo bauddhair iṣyate.  ataḥ kathaṃ tasya dvairūpyam iti (Ślokavārttikakāśikā p. 126,15–21).
“For your [Buddhist] siddhānta is that cognition is without parts. And it’s not possible that something of that kind could have a double nature.  But as for the self, by contrast, it is the perceiver by means of a certain nature and the perceived by means of a certain [different] nature.  So what is not possible [about that]?  To explain further – the self’s (asya) so called cognition (pratyaya), which is a particular property (dharma), arises when the self is connected with the manas, which is in turn connected with a sense-faculty, which is in turn connected with an object.  And that cognition is to some extent different from the [self], in as much as it is its property.  And the self is a perceiver by means of that.  As for what is perceived [by this cognition in cases of I-cognition], it is the self’s (tasya) nature as substance etc., which is something it shares with all other substances such as earth.  But the Buddhists do not accept that cognition has any such division.  So how could it have a double nature?”