About elisa freschi

My long-term program is to make "Sanskrit Philosophy" part of "Philosophy". You can follow me also on my personal blog: elisafreschi.com, on Academia, on Amazon, etc.

Scripture, authority and reason —About a new book edited by Vincent Eltschinger and Helmut Krasser

How do reason and authority interact and trace each other’s boundaries? Which one is the first to be allowed to delimit its territory and, by means of that, also the other one’s one?

Investigatio semper reformanda

Should we try to periodise Indian philosophy or shall we give up any attempt, since each one will be criticised and is in some respect flawed? Periodisation, as recently highlighted by Julius Lipner, is a form of classification and as Continue reading Investigatio semper reformanda

Before “Classical Indian Philosophy”: the influence of the Sāṅkhya logic UPDATED

We discussed already on this blog about how our conception of “classical Indian philosophy” is contingent and historically determined. For instance, if you were to ask me what “classical Indian philosophy” for me means, I would at first answer with Continue reading Before “Classical Indian Philosophy”: the influence of the Sāṅkhya logic UPDATED

A theist caught in the paradoxes of free will

Can a theist believe in God’s omniscience&omnipotence and in free will? I have argued in other posts that one can think in a compatibilist way (because God wants to be freely loved) and that this entails that no punishment/ban from Continue reading A theist caught in the paradoxes of free will

What did Kumārila have in view when he spoke of a “linguistic force” and of an “objective force”?

A short terminological excursus: bhāvanā is a rather common name throughout Sanskrit philosophy (it designates, e.g., a peculiar meditation in Buddhism and in Kashmir Śivaism, a linguistic function in Bhāṭṭa Nāyaka’s aesthetical theory, etc.). It is also found in grammar. Continue reading What did Kumārila have in view when he spoke of a “linguistic force” and of an “objective force”?

On the epistemology of the extra-ordinary. Or: Do we need to waste our time proving that unicorns do not exist?

Do we need to prove that unicorns, tooth fairies, hobbits and so on do not exist? The question is not just funny, insofar as an upholder of the existence of ghosts and the like could easily claim that —strictly speaking— Continue reading On the epistemology of the extra-ordinary. Or: Do we need to waste our time proving that unicorns do not exist?