A group blog of scholars exploring Indian philosophy
Jay L. Garfield. Engaging Buddhism: Why It Matters to Philosophy. xxii + 376 pp., index. NY: Oxford University Press, 2015. $29.95 (paperback). My job in reviewing this book is made much easier by something Garfield says early on: ‘Mark Siderits Continue reading Book Review of Engaging Buddhism: Why It Matters to Philosophy by Jay L. Garfield (Reviewed by Mark Siderits)
Several distinct component are constitutive of what we now know to be Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta and are not present at the time of Rāmānuja: 1. The inclusion of the Āḻvār’s theology in Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta 2. The Pāñcarātra orientation of both subschools Continue reading What happened at the beginnings of Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta?—Part 2
B. K. Matilal (1935-1991) was undoubtedly one of the most influential scholars of Indian philosophy in the late 20th century. His work has greatly influenced many of us who work on Indian philosophy today, especially if we do so in Continue reading The Matilal Strategy
A reader (Robert Gressis) asked me to give him some advice for a class on philosophy of religion in which he would (admirably) like to insert something more than “the typical western philosophy of religion”. He would be interested in Continue reading Ultimate reality in Hinduism, Buddhism (etc.): Some suggestions for a possible syllabus
Like postulation (arthāpatti), the pramāṇa or instrument of knowledge known as upamāna, often translated as “analogy,” is both fascinating and underdeveloped in contemporary analysis. There are few stand-alone books focusing just on upamāna, although it is frequently treated along with testimony and perception. I suspect this is Continue reading Analogical reasoning and postulation
Well, yes… isn’t it? The problem is less easy than it may look like and amounts to the problem of non-committal understanding. Is it the normal attitude while listening to a speaker or just an exception or an a posteriori Continue reading Can one understand a sentence without believing its content to be the case?
If you have read post-Classical śāstra, you will have certainly encountered the formulation above, describing the three foundational disciplines as focusing on words (pada), i.e., grammatical analysis in Vyākaraṇa sentences (vākya), i.e., textual linguistics in Mīmāṃsā means of knowledge (pramāṇa), Continue reading pada-vākya-pramāṇa… Since when? (with updated reference)
Are words an instrument of knowledge? And, if so, what sort of? Are they an instance of inference insofar as one infers the meaning on the basis of the words used? Or are they are an independent instrument of knowledge, Continue reading Are words an instrument of knowledge?
Compared to the pramāṇa of pratyakṣa (perception) or anumāna (inferential reasoning), arthāpatti (postulation or presumption) has received less attention in contemporary secondary literature. This is unfortunate, since it is broadly recognized as a pramāṇa, whether as a sui generis one, as Continue reading What is arthāpatti?
Humans are not animals according to Descartes’ distinction of res cogitans and res extensa. They are also not animals according to many Christian theologians (Jesus came to save humans, not animals). Perhaps humans are not (only) animals also according to Continue reading Humans as animals