What is the Nyāyasūtra about?
I will be not the first one who notes that the list of padārtha ‘categories’ at the beginning of the Nyāyasūtra is somehow strange.
Category Archives: Indian Philosophical Schools
PostDoc (2+3ys) on Yoga, Ayurveda Alchemy
I am posting the following announcement on behalf of Dagmar Wujastyk, who recently won an ERC project (that is, an amazingly competitive project funded by the EU, for which the chances of success are really low, lower than 10%, but Continue reading PostDoc (2+3ys) on Yoga, Ayurveda Alchemy
Candrakīrti and Jayarāśi on Dignāga’s Epistemology (Part Two)
In Part One, I explained the critiques of Dignāga’s epistemology offered by Candrakīrti and Jayarāśi. In Part Two, I’ll consider whether these arguments create serious problems for Dignāga’s epistemology. I suspect that the two arguments are different in that Candrakīrti Continue reading Candrakīrti and Jayarāśi on Dignāga’s Epistemology (Part Two)
Some common prejudices about Indian Philosophy: It is time to give them up
Is Indian Philosophy “caste-ish”? Yes and no, in the sense that each philosophy is also the result of its sociological milieu, but it is not only that. Is Indian Philosophy only focused on “the Self”? Surely not.
Candrakīrti and Jayarāśi on Dignāga’s Epistemology (Part One)
In his Pramāṇasamuccaya, Dignāga claims that there are two means of knowledge (pramāṇas): perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna). Perception has as its object the particular (svalakṣana); inference has as its object the universal (sāmānyalakṣana). The key distinguishing feature between the two is Continue reading Candrakīrti and Jayarāśi on Dignāga’s Epistemology (Part One)
Necessity in Mīmāṃsā philosophy
Our Anand Vaidya has recently raised a very intriguing discussion on modality in Indian philosophy. His post started with the suggestion that modality is less central in Indian philosophy than it is in Western thought. In the comments, several scholars Continue reading Necessity in Mīmāṃsā philosophy
Why are postulation (arthāpatti) and inference not the same thing?
Arthāpatti ‘postulation’ is the instrument of knowledge through which we know that Devadatta is out given that he is alive and not home. In Classical India, just like among contemporary scholars, several thinkers (especially of the Nyāya school) have tried Continue reading Why are postulation (arthāpatti) and inference not the same thing?
I am a place
Perhaps since Wittgenstein, we’ve become a bit cautious about taking language as a guide to reality, but here is, I suggest, one place where reflection on language provides a profound metaphysical suggestion about the nature of selfhood. Amongst many of Continue reading I am a place
Tricky words: prāp-
The hardest part, I find, about the philosophical vocabulary of Sanskrit is not its enormity or its technicality, but the fact that it includes a couple of “basic” or even “common-sense” words whose import, in any given context, can be Continue reading Tricky words: prāp-
Getting Started in Indian Philosophy: Query for Readers
This is somewhat related to Matt Dasti’s last call-for-papers post, but more geared towards philosophy colleagues, not philosophy courses. If you’re like me, you occasionally have peers saying that they’re interested in Indian philosophy but overwhelmed, and don’t know where Continue reading Getting Started in Indian Philosophy: Query for Readers