The making of Śrīvaiṣṇavism: A tentative hypothesis about its reconstruction

It is difficult to disentangle the different roots of what is now known as Śrīvaiṣṇavism, since this term is usually the label attributed to the religious counterpart of the philosophical-theological school of Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta. However, Vaiṣṇavism was apparently an important Continue reading The making of Śrīvaiṣṇavism: A tentative hypothesis about its reconstruction→

Candrakīrti and Jayarāśi on Dignāga’s Epistemology (Part Two)

In Part One, I explained the critiques of Dignāga’s epistemology offered by Candrakīrti and Jayarāśi. In Part Two, I’ll consider whether these arguments create serious problems for Dignāga’s epistemology. I suspect that the two arguments are different in that Candrakīrti Continue reading Candrakīrti and Jayarāśi on Dignāga’s Epistemology (Part Two)→

Some common prejudices about Indian Philosophy: It is time to give them up

Is Indian Philosophy “caste-ish”? Yes and no, in the sense that each philosophy is also the result of its sociological milieu, but it is not only that. Is Indian Philosophy only focused on “the Self”? Surely not.

Candrakīrti and Jayarāśi on Dignāga’s Epistemology (Part One)

In his Pramāṇasamuccaya, Dignāga claims that there are two means of knowledge (pramāṇas): perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna). Perception has as its object the particular (svalakṣana); inference has as its object the universal (sāmānyalakṣana). The key distinguishing feature between the two is Continue reading Candrakīrti and Jayarāśi on Dignāga’s Epistemology (Part One)→

Call for Papers: Is Theology Comparable? (Rome, September 17–19 2015)

Recently a few articles (see here, here and here) have raised the issue of whether philosophy of religion is not really little more than Christian apologetics. A straightforward answer would be that it is not, but an output of the Continue reading Call for Papers: Is Theology Comparable? (Rome, September 17–19 2015)→

Philosophy and Cultural Diversity: A Follow Up On Keating’s Questions

The Philosophy Meets Cultural Diversity Conference has now ended. And I wanted to return to Malcolm Keating’s Questions. I won’t address his questions directly, although some of what I say will hit on issues his questions raise. I will begin by Continue reading Philosophy and Cultural Diversity: A Follow Up On Keating’s Questions→

Necessity in Mīmāṃsā philosophy

Our Anand Vaidya has recently raised a very intriguing discussion on modality in Indian philosophy. His post started with the suggestion that modality is less central in Indian philosophy than it is in Western thought. In the comments, several scholars Continue reading Necessity in Mīmāṃsā philosophy→

Philosophy Meets Cultural Diversity

Warp, Weft, and Way draws our attention to an upcoming conference, called “Philosophy Meets Cultural Diversity,” at the University of Pittsburgh. Here is a link to the program, which has as its goal “to bring together anthropologists, psychologists, comparative philosophers, and Continue reading Philosophy Meets Cultural Diversity→

Why are postulation (arthāpatti) and inference not the same thing?

Arthāpatti ‘postulation’ is the instrument of knowledge through which we know that Devadatta is out given that he is alive and not home. In Classical India, just like among contemporary scholars, several thinkers (especially of the Nyāya school) have tried Continue reading Why are postulation (arthāpatti) and inference not the same thing?→