A group blog of scholars exploring Indian philosophy
Mīmāṃsā authors distinguish between fixed/conditional duties on the one hand, and elective duties on the other. Even Maṇḍana wants to keep them distinct, though insisting that in both cases the commands can be reduced to descriptions of states of affairs. Continue reading Fixed duties vs imperfect duties
One cannot solve the Agnīṣomīya problem (the clash between the prohibition to perform any violence and the prescription to slaughter an animal as an offer to Agni and Soma) via an appeal to suspension (bādha) of the prohibition to perform Continue reading On sacrificial violence
I have been working for years on mapping the deontic space of Mīmāṃsā authors. In order to do that, I tried to find a balance between systematicity, for the purpose of which I need as many information as possible and Continue reading Rights in Mīmāṃsā and further steps in mapping the deontic horizon—Updated
The following are a few random notes on permissions which have not (yet) found a place in an article. 1. A colleague wondered whether the command my co-authors and I have been discussing in several articles on Mīmāṃsā and called Continue reading Further notes on Mīmāṃsā permission
I started thinking about rights while working on permissions, because some deontic logicians think that permissions need to be also independent of prohibitions, in order to ground rights. Now, as I argued elsewhere, Mīmāṃsā permissions are always exceptions to previous Continue reading Thinking about rights in Sanskrit philosophy
Within TV ad 1.3.4, (Mimamsadarsana 1929-34, pp. 192–193), Kumārila discusses a seeming deontic conflict and solves it by appealing to the different responsibilities (adhikāra) of the various addressees. He explains that the prescription to learn the Vedas for 48 years Continue reading Ought entails can (and prohibitions imply possibility) in Kumārila (and Śabara)
What happens when commands clash? A standard devise to deal with the topic is the idea of taking one as a general rule and the other as a specific one. In Sanskrit, these are called, respectively, utsarga and apavāda. Mīmāṃsā Continue reading General and specific rules in Mīmāṃsā?
Within chapter 11 of his masterpiece, the Vidhiviveka `Discernment about prescription’, Maṇḍana identifies the core element which causes people to undertake actions. Maṇḍana expands on Kumārila’s intuition about human behaviour being always goal-oriented by offering a radical reductionist hypothesis. According Continue reading A preliminary understanding of Maṇḍana’s pratibhā
Mīmāṃsā authors distinguish broadly between prescriptions (vidhi) and prohibitions (niṣedha). The first ones are linked with a result, so that if one has fulfilled them, they get a reward. The latter, if respected, don’t lead to any result, whereas they Continue reading Reparations, expiations and prāyaścittas
Mīmāṃsā authors deal with conflicting commands according to a decreasing scale of preferences, which seems to me comparable to the scale of preferences according to which one deals with legal conflicts. Starting from below, 4) The least preferred option is Continue reading Four ways to deal with deontic conflicts