Book Review of Engaging Buddhism: Why It Matters to Philosophy by Jay L. Garfield (Reviewed by Mark Siderits)

Jay L. Garfield. Engaging Buddhism: Why It Matters to Philosophy. xxii + 376 pp., index. NY: Oxford University Press, 2015. $29.95 (paperback). My job in reviewing this book is made much easier by something Garfield says early on: ‘Mark Siderits Continue reading Book Review of Engaging Buddhism: Why It Matters to Philosophy by Jay L. Garfield (Reviewed by Mark Siderits)

The Matilal Strategy

B. K. Matilal (1935-1991) was undoubtedly one of the most influential scholars of Indian philosophy in the late 20th century. His work has greatly influenced many of us who work on Indian philosophy today, especially if we do so in Continue reading The Matilal Strategy

Amod Lele on Śāntideva and the impact of metaphysics on ethics

In an article available open access online (thanks for this altruistic move, Amod!), Amod recently discussed a challenging topic, namely whether there is a link between metaphysical issues and ethics in Buddhist philosophy. More precisely, he focused on Śāntideva’s* Bodhicāryāvatāra Continue reading Amod Lele on Śāntideva and the impact of metaphysics on ethics

Ultimate reality in Hinduism, Buddhism (etc.): Some suggestions for a possible syllabus

A reader (Robert Gressis) asked me to give him some advice for a class on philosophy of religion in which he would (admirably) like to insert something more than “the typical western philosophy of religion”. He would be interested in Continue reading Ultimate reality in Hinduism, Buddhism (etc.): Some suggestions for a possible syllabus

Does Śāntideva’s theory make demands?

My friend Stephen Harris recently posted an interesting article on the question of whether Śāntideva’s ethics is “overdemanding”. I appreciate the article’s methodological approach. It engages Śāntideva’s ethics with the categories of analytical moral philosophy while moving beyond the relatively Continue reading Does Śāntideva’s theory make demands?

Are words an instrument of knowledge?

Are words an instrument of knowledge? And, if so, what sort of? Are they an instance of inference insofar as one infers the meaning on the basis of the words used? Or are they are an independent instrument of knowledge, Continue reading Are words an instrument of knowledge?

Two (or three) different narratives on Yoga, Mīmāṃsā, Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta etc.

Some authors tend to think that once upon a time there was one Yoga and that later this has been “altered” or has at least “evolved” into many forms. According to their own stand, they might look at this developments Continue reading Two (or three) different narratives on Yoga, Mīmāṃsā, Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta etc.

Candrakīrti and Jayarāśi on Dignāga’s Epistemology (Part Two)

In Part One, I explained the critiques of Dignāga’s epistemology offered by Candrakīrti and Jayarāśi. In Part Two, I’ll consider whether these arguments create serious problems for Dignāga’s epistemology. I suspect that the two arguments are different in that Candrakīrti Continue reading Candrakīrti and Jayarāśi on Dignāga’s Epistemology (Part Two)

Some common prejudices about Indian Philosophy: It is time to give them up

Is Indian Philosophy “caste-ish”? Yes and no, in the sense that each philosophy is also the result of its sociological milieu, but it is not only that. Is Indian Philosophy only focused on “the Self”? Surely not.