Individuality in Vaikuṇṭha

Do the inhabitants of Vaikuṇṭha have desires (or only God’s ones)? Veṅkaṭanātha’s Nyāyasiddhāñjana 174–6 seems to suggest that they can will: In the same way, Ananta and Garuḍa and the other (permanently liberated souls) and the liberated souls assume this Continue reading Individuality in Vaikuṇṭha

New Article: “Pramāṇavāda and the Crisis of Skepticism in the Modern Public Sphere” by Amy Donahue

Readers of the Indian Philosophy Blog may be interested to learn about a new article in the latest issue of the Journal of World Philosophies: “Pramāṇavāda and the Crisis of Skepticism in the Modern Public Sphere” by Amy Donahue (Kennesaw State University). Continue reading New Article: “Pramāṇavāda and the Crisis of Skepticism in the Modern Public Sphere” by Amy Donahue

Solipsism in Sanskrit philosophy: Preliminary thoughts

How do Sanskrit philosophers deal with solipsism? Some Buddhist epistemologists just accepted it, as a necessary consequence of their idealism. The example of Ratnakīrti’s “Rejection of the existence of other continuous sequences [of causes and effects leading to the illusion Continue reading Solipsism in Sanskrit philosophy: Preliminary thoughts

Book Review of Indian and Intercultural Philosophy: Personhood, Consciousness, and Causality by Douglas L. Berger (Reviewed by Chris Rahlwes)

Douglas L. Berger. Indian and Intercultural Philosophy: Personhood, Consciousness, and Causality. viii + 231 pp., London, New York, and Dublin: Bloomsbury Academic. 2021. $115 (hardback). In the introduction of Indian and Intercultural Philosophy Berger notes: “In certain respects, a number Continue reading Book Review of Indian and Intercultural Philosophy: Personhood, Consciousness, and Causality by Douglas L. Berger (Reviewed by Chris Rahlwes)

Naive referentialism and Indian philosophy. A Guest post by Johannes Bronkhorst

In a number of publications, I have had the audacity to propose an explanation for certain developments in the history Indian philosophy.1 A simple assumption made clear how and why Indian thinkers had adopted a number of at first sight Continue reading Naive referentialism and Indian philosophy. A Guest post by Johannes Bronkhorst

Mapping the territory: Sanskrit cosmopolis, 1500–today

There is a lot to do in the European intellectual history, with, e.g., major theories that await an improved understanding and connections among scholars that have been overseen or understudied. Using a simile, one might say that a lot of Continue reading Mapping the territory: Sanskrit cosmopolis, 1500–today

“dadhi and dadhy are two different words”

The case of combination variants like dadhi and dadhy is used by Nyāya authors as an evidence of the fact that words are produced and modified. Mīmāṃsā authors, who think that language is without beginning, need to respond to that Continue reading “dadhi and dadhy are two different words”

Reconstructing Viśiṣṭādvaitavedānta: Veṅkaṭanātha’s contribution

The book on Veṅkaṭanātha I am working on is an attempt of doing history of philosophy in the Sanskrit context, given that no agreed canon, chronology, list of main figures or main questions has been established for the history of Continue reading Reconstructing Viśiṣṭādvaitavedānta: Veṅkaṭanātha’s contribution

Reflections on the translation of SM 1

Scholars of Sanskrit (as well as ancient Greek, classical Tamil, Chinese…) are familiar with translations oscillating between the following two extremes: A translation which closely follows the original and is chiefly meant as an aid to understand the Sanskrit text Continue reading Reflections on the translation of SM 1

Veṅkaṭanātha’s śāstric style in the Seśvaramīmāṃsā

Veṅkaṭanātha follows the standard śāstric style when it comes to the general way of asking questions, discussing answers, and of providing rationales for each claim. To that, he adds his command, evident in his non-śāstric works, of figurative language, so Continue reading Veṅkaṭanātha’s śāstric style in the Seśvaramīmāṃsā