Kumārila and the limits of perception

According to Kumārila, much can be sense-perceived. It goes without saying that sensible qualities can be sense-perceived, but Kumārila thinks that we can also sense-perceive the substance behind the sense-qualities (that is, the substrate of the sense-qualities). He also thinks Continue reading Kumārila and the limits of perception

Does Kumārila accept I-cognition as a kind of perception?

Kumārila is an extremely systematic thinker. Thus, if there is a seeming contradiction in Kumārila’s thought, it is likely the case that the contradiction is only a seeming one and that it can be solved. In the case at stake, Continue reading Does Kumārila accept I-cognition as a kind of perception?

Cognition of the self

How does one know about the self, according to the three main schools discussed in my last post? Buddhist Epistemological School (Dharmakīrti): the self does not exist. The only thing that exists is a stream (santāna) of causally linked momentary Continue reading Cognition of the self