The role of manas in perception according to Kumārila

Manas plays multiple roles for Kumārila and it is important to keep them apart: manas connecting sense faculty to ātman while sensing an external object (see ŚV pratyakṣa 160ab) manas working itself as a sense faculty for pain and pleasure Continue reading The role of manas in perception according to Kumārila→

Again on ahampratyaya in Kumārila (using Watson 2010 and 2020)

My previous post on Kumārila’s cognition of the I (here: https://elisafreschi.com/2026/02/15/does-kumarila-accept-i-cognition-as-a-kind-of-perception/) was part of an ongoing conversation with Alex Watson, who patiently prompted me to read or re-read (respectively) his 2010 (“Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha’s Elaboration of Self-Awareness (svasaṃvedana)…”) and 2020 (“Four Continue reading Again on ahampratyaya in Kumārila (using Watson 2010 and 2020)→

Cognition of the self

How does one know about the self, according to the three main schools discussed in my last post? Buddhist Epistemological School (Dharmakīrti): the self does not exist. The only thing that exists is a stream (santāna) of causally linked momentary Continue reading Cognition of the self→

Thoughts on Realisms interlinked by Arindam Chakrabarti/3

Main thesis: While we move from realism about objects to realism about subjects and other subjects, Arindam’s commitment to naïve realism decreases. Since I have discussed in the first two previous posts about how Arindam’s methodology makes him do philosophy Continue reading Thoughts on Realisms interlinked by Arindam Chakrabarti/3→