My 2010 article (“Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha’s Elaboration of Self-Awareness (svasaṃvedana), and How it Differs from Dharmakīrti’s Exposition of the Concept”) listed eight differences between self-awareness (svasaṃvedana) and I-cognition (ahampratyaya). (Pre-modern Indian philosophers could be divided into three groups, depending on whether they thought the self is perceived by neither of these, by one of them, or by both. Note that whether the self is perceived through self-awareness is a completely separate question from whether cognition/consciousness is perceived through self-awareness.)
One of these eight differences was that self-awareness is the same for everyone, whereas whether I-cognition is the same for everyone is not clear. What does “same for everyone” mean here?
We are not speaking about numerical sameness (all of the main participants in this debate – Mīmāṃsakas, Naiyāyikas, Buddhists – thought that each person’s cognitions are numerically distinct from everyone else’s; there is no disagreement about that). The issue is rather qualitative sameness: are my cognitions qualitatively indistinguishable from other people’s – in the way that a batch of freshly minted 10-rupee coins are qualitatively indistinguishable. For two cognitions to be qualitatively distinguishable is for them to be experienced as in some way different from each other. Such a difference in what it is like to experience cognition is determined by what is presented to the subject while they are experiencing the cognition. So in order to determine whether two cognitions are the “same”, in the sense of that word in which we are interested, we have to investigate what is presented to the subject.
Clearly a cognition of a pot and a cognition of a cloth are not qualitatively indistinguishable, for the two different cognitions present distinguishable things to the subject. All instances of perception of the self through self-awareness, by contrast, are qualitatively indistinguishable. This is explicitly asserted, by Rāmakaṇṭha for example (Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa ad 1:5, p. 13,15–17),[1] and defended in this way:
- What self-awareness presents to the subject is the self, and selves are qualitatively identical.
- But could not two subjects experience qualitatively identical things differently? Only if the way the subject experiences the thing depends to some extent on their subjective conceptual framework. In self-awareness there is no room for any interference by a subjective conceptual framework, because what is being perceived is exactly the same thing that is doing the perceiving. There is no gap for subjective intermediate factors to intervene; what is presented to the subject depends entirely on the character of the thing being perceived.
- How about if the sense-faculty or the internal faculty (manas) involved in the production of the experience could differ between different people and so produce an experience in one person slightly different from that of another? In self-awareness neither a sense-faculty nor the manas are involved. It is just the nature of the self to present itself to itself in every moment; so this continues when the self is separated from sense-faculties and manas at liberation, and between incarnations.
How about the question of whether different people’s I-cognitions are qualitatively identical? Here there is the possibility of difference because, unlike self-awareness, I-cognition (1) is conceptual perception, so an intermediary concept is involved; (2) is brought about by the manas. In the 2010 article, I thus argued that it is not easy to come down definitively on either side of this question of I-cognitions’ sameness or not. Elisa picks up on this (https://indianphilosophyblog.org/2026/02/27/again-on-ahampratyaya-in-kumarila-using-watson-2010-and-2020/), and suggests that:
“Kumārila favours a “thick” view of the subject, so that ahampratyayas would be distinguishable”.
So for the rest of this post I will give some thoughts, not included in my 2010 article, on this question of whether, for Kumārila, I-cognitions are qualitatively distinguishable.
Let’s first differentiate between what I will call “bodily I-cognitions” and “mental I-cognitions”. The former are those in which “I” occurs in apposition with bodily attributes. Examples commonly given by Sanskrit authors are: “I am dark”, “I am fair”, “I am fat”, “I am thin”, “I am heavy”, “I am light”, “I am moving”.
Now a first attempt to answer our question might be:
- bodily I-cognitions differ in their content
- mental I-cognitions do not
Why? Because bodies are qualitatively different from each other, whereas selves are perhaps not. Perhaps? Well for some self-theorists (ātmavādins) the natures of different selves are indistinguishable from each other, but that is not the case for Kumārila. For Sāṃkhyas, for whom selves are devoid of qualities (nirguṇa), the nature of any self is indistinguishable from any other self. For Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas, selves have particular qualities, but these qualities are ontologically quite distinct from the self in which they inhere. They are part of the “not-self” (e.g. Nyāyabhāṣya p. 6,9–10) from which at the time of liberation the self becomes separated, and thus able to reside in its true nature. So it is easy to “separate out” a core self whose nature is untouched by its qualities and therefore indistinguishable from the nature of all other selves. For Kumārila, on the other hand, there is a porous boundary between the self-substance and its qualities, so that the self-substance cannot be separated out easily. The self-substance of the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas is “untouched” by its qualities, for Kumārila it is not. To state this using Sanskrit terminology: for Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas the relation between the self-substance and its qualities is difference (guṇaguṇinor bhedaḥ); for Kumārila it is difference and non-difference (guṇaguṇinor bhedābhedaḥ).
What was the point of the discussion in the previous paragraph? It was triggered by the following question. Is there a core nature, common to all selves, that could potentially form the content of mental I-cognitions? The answer will be yes for Sāṃkhyas, Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas; but perhaps no for Kumārila. We might think that for Kumārila all that I-cognition can “get at” is a self-substance that is thoroughly imbued with particular qualities (Elisa’s “thick subject”) – qualities that are distinct both from subject to subject, and within one subject at different times.
So a second attempt to answer our question, taking this into consideration, can be:
For Kumārila
- bodily I-cognitions differ
- mental I-cognitions differ (Elisa’s view)
But it turns out – so I will now argue in a third attempt – that:
For Kumārila
- bodily I-cognitions do not differ
- mental I-cognitions do not differ
First, mental I-cognitions. In my 2020 article (“Four Mīmāṃsā Views Concerning the Self’s Perception of Itself”), I distinguish four different Mīmāṃsā answers to the question of what is happening when the self perceives itself. Kumārila’s view – as articulated in the śūnyavāda chapter of the Ślokavārttika (v. 68) – is as follows:
- the “cognition-part” of the self perceives the “substance-nature” of the self[2]
So in order to establish whether everyone’s I-cognitions are qualitatively indistinguishable, we need to consider whether there are qualitative differences between the substance-nature of different people’s selves.
1. That each different substance has a qualitatively different substance-nature would be a strange idea. A substance-nature should be precisely what all substances have in common (and all non-substances lack).
2. Sucarita’s commentary on this verse explicitly states that the “substance-nature” of the self – the thing perceived by I-cognition – is a nature that the self shares with all other substances, including insentient substances such as earth.[3]
3. It is not only Sucarita, but also Jayanta, who points out that the content of I-cognition for Kumārila – the self’s substance-nature – is something shared even by insentient substances. He points out that it is shared by pots and such like.[4]
Given that for Kumārila
- (1) what is experienced in I-cognition is the self’s substance-nature
- (2) one self’s substance-nature is qualitatively indistinguishable from another self’s substance-nature (and even from a pot’s substance-nature)
it follows that I-cognition experiences something common to all cognizers. Since it experiences something that does not vary from cognizer to cognizer, it follows that what it is like to undergo an I-cognition is the same for all cognizers.
***
That I-cognition grasps something shared even by pots and earth atoms forms the basis of an objection against Kumārila’s view: If all that is being perceived is this substance-nature, then we do not have a proper case of self-perception. Kumārila claims that the self can perceive itself, but his elaboration of what is happening in this purported self-perception is: cognition perceives something completely other than itself, something completely unconscious. For proper self-perception we need the perceiving part of the self – its cognition – to be perceived, but on Kumārila’s view it remains completely unperceived.
We find versions of this objection articulated both by Kumārila’s Mīmāṃsaka commentators, such as Sucarita,[5] and by opponents of his view such as Jayanta.[6] When Cakradhara fills out Jayanta’s objection, he remarks that the part of the self being perceived, on this view, is something that should be referred to with pronouns like idam (‘it’), being pure object—rather than aham (‘I’).[7]
This kind of objection provokes Umbeka to put forward a different view (“View 3” in my “Four Mīmāṃsā Views …”), not susceptible to this objection. He claims that, in I-cognition, it is not a conscious part of the self perceiving an unconscious part of the self: he separates out two separate aspects of the conscious part of the self, and claims that one of these is perceiving the other.
Why did not Kumārila go for this view, which is not vulnerable to the objection? Because Kumārila was trying to avoid a different objection. Kumārila, throughout the śūnyavāda chapter of the Ślokavārttika argues vehemently against the Buddhist vijñānavādin view that cognition/consciousness can be simultaneously perceiver and perceived. His claim that the self can perceive itself thus provokes the objection that he is being inconsistent. That his view was motivated by avoiding this objection is suggested by the fact that immediately before giving his view (v. 68), he puts precisely this objection into the mouth of his Vijñānavādin opponent (v. 67cd). To avoid the objection, he needs an analysis of I-cognition that does not involve cognition perceiving itself. He thus has the perceiver as cognition, and the perceived as an unconscious part of the self, completely separate from cognition.
In order to avoid this trap that Kumārila falls into, Umbeka falls into another trap – precisely the trap that Kumārila managed to avoid. Kumārila managed to avoid a view that involves cognition perceiving itself; Umbeka does not. Perhaps this is why the objection made (by Jayanta) against Umbeka’s view is that he is “following the path of Vijñānavāda”.[8]
The reason I continue the story beyond Kumārila to Umbeka is that with the latter we do have something that fits Elisa’s claim of a thick subject being perceptible and being something that differs qualitatively from other thick subjects. Since Umbeka unlike Kumārila includes, within the domain of what is perceived in I-cognition, the particular cognition – of a pot, say – currently taking place, we can characterize what is perceived by I-cognition as “thick” in how much it includes. We can attribute to Umbeka the view that I-cognitions vary depending on what particular object is currently being perceived – i.e. vary between different cognizers and within one cognizer at different times.
***
I said that in this third attempt I would argue for the position that not only mental I-cognitions, but also bodily I-cognitions, do not differ between different subjects. We turn now to bodily I-cognitions. The evidence here is Ślokavārttika ātmavāda verses 126–134, where Kumārila discusses cognitions such as “I’m heavy”, “I’m fat”, “I’m thin”. He introduces the section by claiming (126) that every I-cognition perceives the self. How can that possibly include these kind of bodily I-cognitions? He argues that three things are happening here:
- There is an I-cognition of the self
- There is a cognition of a bodily attribute
- There is a third cognition in which the latter is incorrectly superimposed on to the self
He wants to reserve the term “I-cognition” for only the first of these 3. Thus “I’m heavy” is not an I-cognition; only the “I” part of it is. Thus all I-cognitions involve perceiving the self – in particular the self’s substance-nature. Thus even the I-cognition contained within “I am heavy” will be indistinguishable from the I-cognition contained in “I am light”.
***
Watson (2010) ‘Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha’s Elaboration of Self-Awareness (svasaṃvedana), and How it Differs from Dharmakīrti’s Exposition of the Concept.’ Journal of Indian Philosophy 38, 3: pp. 297–321. DOI: 10.1007/s10781-010-9094-8.
Watson (2020) ‘Four Mīmāṃsā Views Concerning the Self’s Perception of Itself.’ Journal of Indian Philosophy 48, 5: pp. 889-914. DOI: 10.1007/s10781-020-09446-x. Watson (2026) ‘A New Edition of the Section of the Nyāyamañjarī Concerned with the Question of Whether We can Perceive the Self’ in H. David, A. Klebanov and V. Davella (eds.) Vidvanmānasaprasādinī: Essays in Honour of S.L.P. Anjaneya Sarma. Collection Indologie 166, pp. 487–540. Pondicherry: EFEO/IFP.
[1] na hi pratidarśanaṃ vyavasthāpakānāṃ sarvapramātṝṇām anubhavabhedaḥ sambhavati, tasya svabhāvasiddhatvāt.
“For the [self-]awareness of all knowers who set out [views] in the different philosophical traditions cannot differ, because it is established [entirely] by [its] own nature [not at all by the mental conditioning of knowers].”
[2] kathaṃcid dharmarūpeṇa bhinnatvāt pratyayasya tat |
grāhakatvaṃ bhavet tatra, grāhyaṃ dravyādi cātmanaḥ ||
“The property of perceiverhood (tat grāhakatvam) with regard to the [self] (tatra) can be assigned to cognition (pratyayasya), because cognition, as a property (dharma), is to some extent different [from its locus]; what is perceived is the self’s [nature as] substance etc.”
Kumārila’s dravyādi is glossed by Sucarita and Pārthasārathi as dravyādirūpa, and by Umbeka as dravyarūpa.
[3] nirbhāgaṃ hi jñānam iti vaḥ siddhāntaḥ. na caivaṃvidhasya dvairūpaym upapannam. ātmā tu kenacid ātmanā grāhakaḥ, kenacid ātmanā grāhya iti kiṃ nopapadyate. tathā hi – asyārthasaṃyuktendkriyasaṃyuktamanassaṃyoginaḥ pratyayo nāma dharmabhedo jāyate. sa cāsmāt kathañcid dharmarūpeṇa bhinnaḥ. tena cāyaṃ grāhakaḥ. yat tasya pṛthivyādidravyāntarasādhāraṇaṃ dravyādirūpaṃ tad grāhyam. jñānasya tu naivaṃvidhaḥ kaścid vibhāgo bauddhair iṣyate. ataḥ kathaṃ tasya dvairūpyam iti (Ślokavārttikakāśikā p. 126,15–21).
“For your [Buddhist] siddhānta is that cognition is without parts. And it’s not possible that something of that kind could have a double nature. But as for the self, by contrast, it is the perceiver by means of a certain nature and the perceived by means of a certain [different] nature. So what is not possible [about that]? To explain further – the self’s (asya) so called cognition (pratyaya), which is a particular property (dharma), arises when the self is connected with the manas, which is in turn connected with a sense-faculty, which is in turn connected with an object. And that cognition is to some extent different from the [self], in as much as it is its property. And the self is a perceiver by means of that. As for what is perceived [by this cognition in cases of I-cognition], it is the self’s (tasya) nature as substance etc., which is something it shares with all other substances such as earth. But the Buddhists do not accept that cognition has any such division. So how could it have a double nature?”
[4] yac ca avasthākṛtaṃ bhedam avalambya grāhyagrāhakabhāvasamarthanam ekasyaivātmanaḥ kṛtaṃ – kila dravyādirūpam ātmano grāhyaṃ jñātṛrūpaṃ ca grāhakam iti – tad anupapannam;dravyādirūpe grāhye, na jñātari, grāhyatā sādhitā syāt. ātmavartino ’pi dravyādirūpasya ghaṭāditulyatvāt (Nyāyamañjarī Vol. 2, p. 270,9–12; Watson 2026: §2.3.1).
“As for the enabling of a relation of perceiver and perceived in a single self, attempted [by Kumārila] by resorting to a difference [within the self], resulting from [a difference of] states – namely “The self’s nature as substance and such like is the perceived, and its nature as agent of cognition is the perceiver” – that is inadmissible. Only the perceived [part of the self, i.e. its] nature as substance and such like, but not [the part that is] the agent of cognition, would be established [ex hypothesi] to become an object of perception. For the nature as substance and such like, although it exists in the self, is common to pots and other [substances].”
[5] nanv evaṃ paragocara evāhampratyayo bhavet, param hi pratyayātmano dravyādirūpam (Ślokavārttikakāśikā ad śūnyavāda 69ab, p. 127,3–4).
“I-cognition would comprehend something other than [its own agent]; for the nature as substance etc. is something different from the nature as cognition”.
[6] tad anupapannam; dravyādirūpe grāhye, na jñātari, grāhyatā sādhitā syāt. ātmavartino ’pi dravyādirūpasya ghaṭāditulyatvāt (Nyāyamañjarī Vol. 2, p. 270,9–12; Watson 2026: §2.3.1).
“That is inadmissible. Only the perceived [part of the self, i.e. its] nature as substance and such like, but not [the part that is] the agent of cognition, would be established [ex hypothesi] to become an object of perception. For the nature as substance and such like, although it exists in the self, is common to pots and other [substances].”
[7] tataś ca ghaṭādivat “idam”nirdeśyaḥ syād grāhyāṃśaḥ pṛthag eva, punar apy ātmano jñātur na grāhyatvam (Granthibhaṅga p. 182).
“And thus the part [of the self] that is being perceived would be, like a pot, designated as “this”, something quite separate [from the perceiving part], while the perceiving part of the self would not itself be perceived.”
[8] Nyāyamañjarī II 272,1 (Watson 2006: 534, §2.3.4): vijñānavādavartma saṃśritaṃ syāt.