Does Śāntideva’s theory make demands?

My friend Stephen Harris recently posted an interesting article on the question of whether Śāntideva’s ethics is “overdemanding”. I appreciate the article’s methodological approach. It engages Śāntideva’s ethics with the categories of analytical moral philosophy while moving beyond the relatively Continue reading Does Śāntideva’s theory make demands?

Book Review of The Śrīvaiṣṇava Theological Dispute by Patricia Y. Mumme (Reviewed by Elisa Freschi)

Patricia Y. Mumme. The Śrīvaiṣṇava Theological Dispute. Maṇavāḷamāmuni and Vedānta Deśika. xviii+320 pp., index. Bangalore: Navbharath Publications, 2000 (1st ed. Madras 1988). 25 USD. The book is a unique contribution to the study of Śrīvaiṣṇavism insofar as it takes into Continue reading Book Review of The Śrīvaiṣṇava Theological Dispute by Patricia Y. Mumme (Reviewed by Elisa Freschi)

Can one understand a sentence without believing its content to be the case?

Well, yes… isn’t it? The problem is less easy than it may look like and amounts to the problem of non-committal understanding. Is it the normal attitude while listening to a speaker or just an exception or an a posteriori Continue reading Can one understand a sentence without believing its content to be the case?

pada-vākya-pramāṇa… Since when? (with updated reference)

If you have read post-Classical śāstra, you will have certainly encountered the formulation above, describing the three foundational disciplines as focusing on words (pada), i.e., grammatical analysis in Vyākaraṇa sentences (vākya), i.e., textual linguistics in Mīmāṃsā means of knowledge (pramāṇa), Continue reading pada-vākya-pramāṇa… Since when? (with updated reference)

Śabara on sentences

The discussion on the epistemological validity of sentences starts in Jaimini’s Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtra (PMS) and in Śabara’s commentary thereon when the opponent notes that, even if —as established in PMS 1.1.5— there were really an originary connection between words Continue reading Śabara on sentences

Are words an instrument of knowledge?

Are words an instrument of knowledge? And, if so, what sort of? Are they an instance of inference insofar as one infers the meaning on the basis of the words used? Or are they are an independent instrument of knowledge, Continue reading Are words an instrument of knowledge?

What is arthāpatti?

Compared to the pramāṇa of pratyakṣa (perception) or anumāna (inferential reasoning), arthāpatti (postulation or presumption) has received less attention in contemporary secondary literature. This is unfortunate, since it is broadly recognized as a pramāṇa, whether as a sui generis one, as Continue reading What is arthāpatti?

Two (or three) different narratives on Yoga, Mīmāṃsā, Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta etc.

Some authors tend to think that once upon a time there was one Yoga and that later this has been “altered” or has at least “evolved” into many forms. According to their own stand, they might look at this developments Continue reading Two (or three) different narratives on Yoga, Mīmāṃsā, Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta etc.

JBSP celebrates its 46th year with free articles, including a classic from J.N. Mohanty

Ullrich Haase, editor of the Journal of the British Society of Phenomenology has announced a selection of free articles from past issues: Special Online Issue of the JBSP: The Editor’s Pick: 33 Essays from 1970 – 2014 Dear Philosophers, Phenomenologists, Continue reading JBSP celebrates its 46th year with free articles, including a classic from J.N. Mohanty