A group blog of scholars exploring Indian philosophy
Like postulation (arthāpatti), the pramāṇa or instrument of knowledge known as upamāna, often translated as “analogy,” is both fascinating and underdeveloped in contemporary analysis. There are few stand-alone books focusing just on upamāna, although it is frequently treated along with testimony and perception. I suspect this is Continue reading Analogical reasoning and postulation
The discussion on the epistemological validity of sentences starts in Jaimini’s Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtra (PMS) and in Śabara’s commentary thereon when the opponent notes that, even if —as established in PMS 1.1.5— there were really an originary connection between words Continue reading Śabara on sentences
Are words an instrument of knowledge? And, if so, what sort of? Are they an instance of inference insofar as one infers the meaning on the basis of the words used? Or are they are an independent instrument of knowledge, Continue reading Are words an instrument of knowledge?
Compared to the pramāṇa of pratyakṣa (perception) or anumāna (inferential reasoning), arthāpatti (postulation or presumption) has received less attention in contemporary secondary literature. This is unfortunate, since it is broadly recognized as a pramāṇa, whether as a sui generis one, as Continue reading What is arthāpatti?
In the arthāpatti reading group we are currently reading the chapter on arthāpatti of Śālikanātha’s Prakaraṇapañcikā. As already discussed, Śālikanātha differentiates arthāpatti from anumāna insofar as in the latter the gamaka `trigger of the cognitive process’ is doubted, whereas, it Continue reading Arthāpatti and the Kevalavyatirekin anumāna
In Part One, I explained the critiques of Dignāga’s epistemology offered by Candrakīrti and Jayarāśi. In Part Two, I’ll consider whether these arguments create serious problems for Dignāga’s epistemology. I suspect that the two arguments are different in that Candrakīrti Continue reading Candrakīrti and Jayarāśi on Dignāga’s Epistemology (Part Two)
In his Pramāṇasamuccaya, Dignāga claims that there are two means of knowledge (pramāṇas): perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna). Perception has as its object the particular (svalakṣana); inference has as its object the universal (sāmānyalakṣana). The key distinguishing feature between the two is Continue reading Candrakīrti and Jayarāśi on Dignāga’s Epistemology (Part One)
The Philosophy Meets Cultural Diversity Conference has now ended. And I wanted to return to Malcolm Keating’s Questions. I won’t address his questions directly, although some of what I say will hit on issues his questions raise. I will begin by Continue reading Philosophy and Cultural Diversity: A Follow Up On Keating’s Questions
Warp, Weft, and Way draws our attention to an upcoming conference, called “Philosophy Meets Cultural Diversity,” at the University of Pittsburgh. Here is a link to the program, which has as its goal “to bring together anthropologists, psychologists, comparative philosophers, and Continue reading Philosophy Meets Cultural Diversity
Arthāpatti ‘postulation’ is the instrument of knowledge through which we know that Devadatta is out given that he is alive and not home. In Classical India, just like among contemporary scholars, several thinkers (especially of the Nyāya school) have tried Continue reading Why are postulation (arthāpatti) and inference not the same thing?